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NOTES
THE FLAWED EXPLICIT SAFETY NET: HOW
FEDERALLY SPONSORED DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CONTRIBUTES TO FINANCIAL CRISIS
Nicholas J. Colombo*
In the spring of 2012, JPMorgan Chase and Co. (JP Morgan), one of the
largest and most profitable banks in the United States, made a $6 billion
mistake. The issues all began in London, with a division of JP Morgan
known as the Chief Investment Office (CIO). While the CIO’s stated
purpose was to use excess deposits to hedge against interest rate risk, it had
in fact been responsible for earning approximately $4 billion in profits for
JP Morgan over the three previous years. This all came to a screeching
halt when Bruno Iksil, now known as the “London Whale,” took a series of
high-risk positions in derivatives and credit default swaps (CDS). To date
the incident has cost JP Morgan billions of dollars in losses and fines and
resulted in the criminal prosecution of several individuals involved in the
incident.
Politicians and commentators have held the London Whale incident up
as another example of large complex financial institutions behaving badly,
and have accordingly pushed for stronger measures to eliminate the
implicit subsidies that make such entities and their bad behavior possible.
Lacking from this debate has been any meaningful discussion of the impact
that explicit subsidies, like deposit insurance, have on the financial system
in the United States. This is despite the fact that the funds the CIO used to
make such fantastic profits for JP Morgan were federally sponsored
deposits. This Note describes how the explicit federal safety net,
specifically federally sponsored deposit insurance, contributes to the
creation of financial instability and, potentially, financial crisis. This Note
then analyzes several proposed reforms that could alleviate these problems,

* I would like to thank Professor Zephyr Teachout for her invaluable guidance during the
writing of this Note, Professor Richard Scott Carnell for taking the time to explain to me the
intricacies of the regulation of financial institutions, my parents for reminding me that
publishing something is a worthwhile endeavor, my grandparents for spending many years in
difficult blue-collar jobs so that I could one day have the privilege of sitting comfortably in a
library conducting academic research, my friends for being supportive and showing an
interest in my work, and Ms. Laura Bryant for spending many a late night listening to me
discuss highly esoteric aspects of the law of deposit insurance.

1237

1238

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

and, while continually advocating for increased attention to this issue,
ultimately suggests a system of narrow depository institutions to solve it.
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INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 2012, Jamie Dimon, the head of JPMorgan Chase and
Co. (JP Morgan), one of the largest and most profitable banks in the United
States, announced that the bank had made a mistake1—a $6 billion
mistake.2 The issues all began in London with a division of JP Morgan
known as the Chief Investment Office (CIO).3 The purpose of the CIO
seemed entirely mundane. It used excess deposits to hedge against interest
rate risk,4 or as JP Morgan itself described, the CIO “‘[i]s focused on
managing the long-term structural assets and liabilities of the firm and is

1. Dan Fitzpatrick, Gregory Zuckerman & Liz Rappaport, J.P. Morgan’s $2 Billion
Blunder—Bank Admits Losses on Massive Trading Bet Gone Wrong; Dimon’s Mea Culpa,
WALL ST. J., May 11, 2012, at A1.
2. Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Charges Against 2 Traders Fault JP
Morgan for Lack of Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2013, at A1.
3. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Susanne Craig, JPMorgan Trading Loss May Reach
$9 Billion, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (June 28, 2012, 2:30 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2012/06/28/jpmorgan-trading-loss-may-reach-9-billion/.
4. Id.
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not focused on short-term profits.’”5 At the same time, this apparently did
not stop the CIO from generating short-term profits, as it reportedly earned
JP Morgan $4 billion in profits during the three previous years.6 This all
changed, however, when Bruno Iksil, now known as the “London Whale,”
took a series of high-risk positions in credit derivatives.7 These positions
turned out to be a mistake, a mistake that has to date cost JP Morgan
approximately $6 billion in losses, several billion in fines, and has resulted
in criminal charges being filed against two other traders in the CIO.8
Politicians and commentators quickly decried the incident as another
example of the problems with large complex financial institutions (LCFIs).9
They argued that big banks like JP Morgan are incentivized to engage in
excessively risky activities because they are protected by an implicit
government safety net known as “too big to fail” (TBTF).10 What was
virtually ignored, however, was the fact that the CIO made all of its highrisk investments and profits using excess deposits.11 These deposits were
insured by the federal government under a program known as deposit
insurance, a government program that, as part of the explicit federal safety
net for banks,12 allows commercial banks like JP Morgan to acquire funds
at an artificially low price, essentially amounting to a federal subsidy.13 In
other words, one could just as easily argue that JP Morgan was incentivized
to make risky investments through the CIO because of the federal subsidy
provided by deposit insurance.
This Note will describe how the explicit federal safety net, specifically
federally sponsored deposit insurance, contributes to the creation of
financial instability and, potentially, financial crisis. Part I describes the
history of deposit insurance in the United States and how it functions
currently. It also discusses the history of banking in the United States and
how banks became a part of the LCFIs that dominate the financial services
industry today. Part II of this Note describes how federally sponsored
deposit insurance creates perverse incentives for banks to engage in certain
high-risk activities and offers some examples of the repercussions. Part III
examines several potential solutions to this problem, including possible

5. Gregory Zuckerman & Katy Burne, “London Whale” Rattles Debt Market, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 6, 2012, at A1.
6. See Silver-Greenberg & Craig, supra note 3.
7. Id.
8. Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, supra note 2.
9. Scott Patterson, “Whale” Capsized Banks’ Rule Effort, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2012,
at C1.
10. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response
to the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 954 (2011). Under this theory, big
banks are able to engage in highly speculative activities because they enjoy protection from
an implicit government safety net, and expect that the government will bail them out with
public funds in a crisis.
11. See Silver-Greenberg & Craig, supra note 3.
12. The explicit federal safety net consists of federally sponsored deposit insurance, the
Federal Reserve’s discount lending window, and the Federal Reserve’s payment system. See
Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 1023 n.308.
13. See infra Part II.
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legal adjustments to deposit insurance, restrictions on the abilities of banks,
and reforms to the entire structure of the banking and financial services
industry. Finally, Part IV of this Note offers a set of reforms to the law
designed to eliminate perverse incentives, protect depositors, increase
economic stability, and encourage profitability for banks and financial
institutions.
I. THE BACKGROUND OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE, BANKS,
AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
This Part discusses all of the relevant background information regarding
deposit insurance in the United States. Part I.A provides an exhaustive
history of deposit insurance in the United States from the early 1800s to the
present, as well as the history of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC). It concludes with a discussion of the changes made by the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank),
including the creation of the Orderly Liquidation Authority. Part I.B
provides a detailed description of the way deposit insurance currently
operates in the United States. Part I.C describes the laws that allowed
banks to develop into LCFIs, and Part I.D details the laws, known as
sections 23A and 23B, that govern the interactions between banks, their
affiliates, and subsidiaries within LCFIs.
A. A Tale As Old As Time: The History of Deposit Insurance
in the United States
This Part provides an exhaustive history of deposit insurance in the
United States from the early 1800s to the present, as well as the history of
the FDIC. Part I.A.1 discusses why a system of deposit insurance is
necessary. Part I.A.2 illustrates how early systems of deposit insurance
worked in the United States, and Part I.A.3 describes how a federally
sponsored deposit insurance system was ultimately created in the United
States. Lastly, Parts I.A.4 and I.A.5 systematically review all of the
legislative changes that have been made to the system since its inception,
including those contained in Dodd-Frank.
1. Don’t Let the Depositors Run Out on Me: Why Banks
Need Deposit Insurance
Prior to 1863, virtually all banks were state-chartered institutions.14 The
National Banking Act of 186315 changed that by establishing a national
banking charter and creating the dual banking system that still exists in the
United States today.16 Banks are generally institutions of limited power,

14. See DAVID H. CARPENTER & M. MAUREEN MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R41181, PERMISSIBLE SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF COMMERCIAL BANKS UNDER THE GLASSSTEAGALL ACT (GSA) AND THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT (GLBA) 3 (2010).
15. National Banking Act of 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665.
16. See CARPENTER & MURPHY, supra note 14, at 3.
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and both their charters and the law limit their activities to the “business of
banking.”17 Structurally, banks are institutions that present unique
challenges. First, they are highly leveraged entities that hold assets much
less liquid than their liabilities.18 Specifically, banks fund loans that are
illiquid and difficult to value with deposits that are withdrawable upon
demand,19 and keep relatively little cash on reserve, usually only enough to
meet customers’ anticipated demand.20 Second, banks are incredibly
important to the national economy, providing a place for citizens to store
their savings and furnishing loans to finance businesses.21
This creates the potential for a problem. If depositors withdraw more
cash than anticipated, and do so without giving the bank sufficient time to
liquefy its assets, the result will be a bank failure.22 Most of the time, banks
are accurately able to anticipate depositor demand and maintain enough
cash on hand.23 However, even the best calculations and preparations are
rendered moot in a panic. If depositors for some reason come to believe
that their bank is at risk of collapsing, many of them, even those who had
not planned to, will rush to the bank to withdraw their funds.24 This is
known as a bank run.25 The result, regardless of whether the bank was
financially troubled or not, is a bank failure.26 If the panic is widespread
and several banks fail, the subsequent shock to the banking industry can
cause widespread economic turmoil.27
The primary goal of deposit insurance, therefore, is to create stability in
the banking industry by helping to prevent the panic that leads to bank runs
in the first place.28 The plan operates under the hope that by providing
insurance for depositors’ funds, depositors will be less fearful of a bank’s
health, less likely to run on banks, and less likely to cause unnecessary bank
failures.29 Furthermore, a system of federally sponsored deposit insurance
17. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (2012). The Office of Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC) has broad authority to determine what constitutes the “business of banking.” See
NationsBank of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 258 n.2 (1995). Many
banks also exist under the corporate structure of a Financial Holding Company (FHC).
FHCs are permitted to engage in a wide variety of finance-related activities entirely
unrelated to commercial banking. Thus, banks within a FHC become affiliated with other
financial institutions. 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (2012).
18. See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 309 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 4th ed. 2009); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The
Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975–2000: Competition,
Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 309.
19. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 309.
20. See id. at 309.
21. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-216, FINANCIAL REGULATION: A
FRAMEWORK FOR CRAFTING AND ASSESSING PROPOSALS TO MODERNIZE THE OUTDATED U.S.
FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM 8 (2009).
22. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 309.
23. See id. at 309.
24. See id. at 309–10.
25. See id. at 309.
26. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 309.
27. See also Wilmarth, supra note 18, at 309.
28. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 310.
29. See id. at 310.
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is considered preferable because the federal government’s vast financial
resources allow it to instill a high level of confidence, which is necessary to
make a deposit insurance system effective.30 A secondary goal of deposit
insurance is to protect small depositors.31
2. Tonight We’re Going To Party Like It’s 1829: Early Systems of
Deposit Insurance in the United States
The early systems of deposit insurance in the United States can be broken
down roughly into two periods: those created in the period from 1829 to
1866, and those created in the period from 1908 to 1930. In 1829, New
York became the first state to create an insurance program covering bank
deposits.32 Between 1831 and 1858, five other states—Vermont, Indiana,
Michigan, Ohio, and Iowa—initiated programs as well.33 These programs
achieved varying levels of success. New York’s, Vermont’s, and
Michigan’s systems all failed.34 The most successful of the six programs
was Indiana’s, which relied on a system of unlimited mutual liability and
self-regulation by banks.35 During its thirty year history, it saw not a single
bank fail.36 Ultimately, all of these systems ceased to exist by 1865 once
national bank charters became more popular.37
Between 1907 and 1917, eight other states adopted deposit insurance
schemes38: Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Oklahoma, Washington, and Texas.39 The systems were all very similar,40
and a majority also granted supervisory authority to state governments to
regulate member banks.41
Supervision turned out to be the biggest problem. The combination of
understaffing, insufficient funding, and fraud made it impossible for the
supervisory systems to be effective.42 This created an incentive for insured
banks to take advantage of cross-subsidization by engaging in excessive
30. See id. at 310–11; see also George G. Kaufman, Bank Failures, Systemic Risk, and
Bank Regulation, 16 CATO J. 17, 24 (1996) (noting that FDIC deposit insurance has
prevented bank runs).
31. See Nancy J. Coppola, Increased Federal Deposit Insurance Coverage: At What
Cost?, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 429, 431 (2002).
32. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION: THE
FIRST FIFTY YEARS 13 (1984); Charles W. Calomiris, Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A
Historical Perspective, 50 J. ECON. HIST. 283, 286 (1990).
33. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 14.
34. See Calomiris, supra note 32, at 286–87. New York’s failure was particularly acute
due to poor funding from limits on annual premiums and ineffectual oversight. See id.
35. Id. at 287–88; see also FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 14, 19.
36. Calomiris, supra note 32, at 287–88; see also FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note
32, at 14, 19.
37. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 22.
38. Id. at 24; see also Clifford F. Thies & Daniel A. Gerlowski, Deposit Insurance: A
History of Failure, 8 CATO J. 677, 680 (1989).
39. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 25–27 tbl. 2.4; see also Thies &
Gerlowski, supra note 38, at 680.
40. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 24–29.
41. Id. at 28; see also Calomiris, supra note 32, at 288.
42. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 28; Calomiris, supra note 32, at 288.
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risk taking and maintaining low levels of capital.43 These practices,
combined with falling agricultural prices and other economic issues of the
1920s, caused many member banks to become insolvent44 and doomed
these systems.45
3. I’ll Be There For You: Crisis and the Creation of the FDIC
By the end of 1930, it became clear that the banking crisis was not just
reserved to the small rural banks that had failed in the 1920s and doomed
the most recent state insurance systems.46 Banks all over the country
suffered from liquidity issues, and bank runs became increasingly
common.47 The situation culminated in the banking crisis of 1933. As a
result of several factors,48 in early 1933, sudden withdrawal demands
created “a panic of massive proportions.”49 By March 4, 1933, “every state
in the Union had declared a bank holiday.”50
After the passage of the Emergency Banking Act of 1933, the immediate
crisis began to subside and the discussion of long-term reform, including
deposit insurance, began.51 Between 1886 and 1933, a total of 150
proposals for federally sponsored deposit insurance were made in Congress,
all with very different elements.52
Of the 150 bills, 118 provided for the establishment of an insurance fund
out of which depositors’ losses would be paid, 22 provided for United
States government guaranty of deposits, and 10 required banks to
purchase surety bonds guaranteeing deposits in full. . . . Eighty percent of
the bills provided for insurance or guaranty of all deposits. . . . In nearly
one-half of the bills the entire cost of deposit insurance . . . was to be met
by assessments based upon total deposits or average total deposits. The
rates of assessment ranged. . . . In a number of bills, assessments upon
the banks were to be supplemented by appropriations from the United
States government . . . [and many others also] called for a limit on the
accumulation of funds by the insurance or guaranty system.53

The bills also differed in their provisions for what organization of the U.S.
government would administer the insurance system.54

43. See Calomiris, supra note 32, at 288–89.
44. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 28. Between 1921 and 1929, an
average of more than 600 banks per year failed. These were predominantly small rural
banks like those insured by the state funds. See id. at 33.
45. See id. at 28; see also Calomiris, supra note 32, at 289.
46. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 33.
47. See id. at 33–37.
48. See id. at 36–38.
49. See id. at 38.
50. Id. A bank holiday occurs when the government suspends all banking transactions
for a period of time, essentially closing all banks. See William L. Silber, Why Did FDR’s
Bank Holiday Succeed?, 15 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 19 (2009).
51. See id. at 40.
52. See id. at 29.
53. See id. at 29–30.
54. See id. at 29.
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Federally sponsored deposit insurance, however, did not lack
opposition.55 Critics, such as Senator Carter Glass of Virginia, the banking
industry, and even President Franklin Roosevelt,56 worried that the system
would be ineffective, promote bad management, and be overly expensive.57
However, the idea enjoyed widespread public support, and thus, when
banking reform bills were proposed in each house of Congress in May
1933, both contained provisions for federally sponsored deposit
insurance.58 Both bills subsequently passed their respective houses and
were sent to a joint conference committee.59 On June 16, 1933, President
Roosevelt signed the Banking Act of 1933 into law, creating federally
sponsored deposit insurance in the United States.60
4. I’ve Got Ninety-Nine Problems and Legislation To Fix Them All:
Legal Adjustments to Deposit Insurance from 1933–2008
Since the creation of the FDIC and federally sponsored deposit insurance
in 1933, the system has undergone several changes due to various
legislative enactments over the years. The Banking Act of 193361 created
the FDIC,62 a temporary deposit insurance plan to begin on January 1,
1934,63 and a permanent plan to become effective six months later.64
Under the temporary plan, depositor protection was limited to $2,500 for
each depositor.65 The permanent plan provided full protection of the first
$10,000 for each depositor, 75 percent coverage for the next $40,000 of
deposits, and 50 percent coverage for all deposits in excess of $50,000.66
However, that system never took effect because of the passage of the
Banking Act of 1935.67
The Banking Act of 193568 created a new permanent plan insuring 100
percent of deposits up to $5,000 for each depositor at an insured
55. See id. at 40–41.
56. See Coppola, supra note 31, at 432 (quoting Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who
claimed that “‘insurance covering all banks would protect improvident operators from the
consequences of their own folly’”).
57. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 40–41.
58. See id. at 41.
59. See id. at 42–43.
60. See id. at 43.
61. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.).
62. See id. § 8, 48 Stat. at 168 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2012)); FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 43.
63. See Banking Act of 1933 § 8, 48 Stat. at 172–80 (current version at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1815); FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 43.
64. See Banking Act of 1933 § 8, 48 Stat. at 172–73 (current version at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821); FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 43.
65. See Banking Act of 1933 § 8, 48 Stat. at 179 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1821);
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 44.
66. See Banking Act of 1933 § 8, 48 Stat. at 173 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1821);
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 44.
67. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 44.
68. Banking Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, 49 Stat. 684 (codified in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.).
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institution.69 The 1935 Act also set the assessment rate at one-twelfth of 1
percent of total deposits.70 Lastly, the 1935 Act gave the FDIC broader
powers to facilitate mergers or consolidations of insured banks.71
In 1950, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act72 created a rebate system.73
This reflected concerns that the assessment rate was too high and the
insurance fund sufficiently funded.74 The 1950 Act also increased the
coverage of insured deposits to $10,000.75 Over the next several years,
various legislative measures increased the limit to $15,000 in 1966, $20,000
in 1969, and $40,000 in 1974.76 In addition, in 1978, the insurance limit for
certain types of retirement accounts was also raised to $100,000.77 In 1980,
the basic limit was raised to $100,000 for all types of deposit accounts78
after the passage of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act (DIDMCA).79 DIDMCA also set a minimum designated
reserve ratio (DRR) of 1.10 percent of estimated insured deposits and a
maximum DRR of 1.40 percent.80
The next significant changes to the FDIC and deposit insurance in the
United States came in 1989 and 1991. In 1989, the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act81 (FIRREA) gave the FDIC
responsibility over insuring the deposits of savings and thrift institutions.82
FIRREA also created two separate insurance funds:
the Savings
Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) and the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF).83
Lastly, FIRREA set the DRR at 1.25 percent of estimated insured deposits,
but allowed the FDIC to increase it to 1.50 percent if necessary.84

69. See id. § 101, 49 Stat. at 694 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1821).
70. See id. § 101, 49 Stat. at 688 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1817).
71. See id. § 101, 49 Stat. at 694–700 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1821).
72. Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-797, 64 Stat. 873.
73. See id. § 2, 64 Stat. at 877–78 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1817).
74. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 58. The rebate system functioned by
subtracting the FDIC’s operating expenses and insurance losses from gross assessment
income, and then splitting the remainder with 60 percent going back to insured institutions
and 40 percent staying with the FDIC. See id. at 60.
75. Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950 § 3, 64 Stat. at 875 (current version at 12
U.S.C. § 1821).
76. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 69.
77. See id.
78. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-221, § 308m, 94 Stat. 132, 147 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1821); FED. DEPOSIT
INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 69.
79. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 94 Stat. at
132 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1821).
80. Id. § 308, 94 Stat. at 148 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(3)(B)).
81. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989). FIRREA was passed largely in response
to the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s. See Coppola, supra note 31, at 433–34.
82. See Coppola, supra note 31, at 433–34.
83. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act § 211, 103 Stat. at
219 (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(4)).
84. See id. § 208, 103 Stat. at 207 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(3)(B)).
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The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 199185
(FDICIA) made two substantial changes to the operation of the FDIC.
First, it required the FDIC to develop a system of risk-based deposit
insurance premiums.86 Second, it imposed a least cost rule on the FDIC
when resolving a failed or closed insured institution.87 Essentially, the least
cost rule requires that the FDIC adopt the resolution method that is least
costly to the deposit insurance fund.88 In addition, the FDICIA kept the
DRR at 1.25 percent of estimated insured deposits, but allowed the FDIC to
raise it to a higher number if justified by the circumstances.89
After the FDICIA, deposit insurance in the United States experienced
relatively little change for the rest of the twentieth century. As Rebecca
Duffy states in her article on deposit insurance, “The late 1990s did not lend
itself as an era for vast discussion of deposit insurance reform because the
economy was booming and banking conditions were favorable—meaning
any discussion of deposit insurance reform was essentially tabled.”90 The
lone exception was the Deposit Insurance Funds Act of 1996.91 That act
prohibited the FDIC from charging premiums to well-capitalized
institutions as long as the funds’ reserve ratio exceeded the DRR.92
However, as the twenty-first century began, discussion of reform
returned.93 The result was the Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of
200594 (FIRA). FIRA made a number of significant changes to the deposit
insurance system in the United States. First, FIRA merged the BIF and
SAIF into one common fund, the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF).95 Second,

85. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
86. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 § 302, 105 Stat. at
2245, 2349 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)); see also Viral V. Acharya,
Joào A. C. Santos & Tanju Yorulmazer, Systemic Risk and Deposit Insurance Premiums, 18
FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 89, 90 (2010) (“Throughout most of the FDIC’s
history, deposit insurance premiums have been independent of bank risk, mainly because of
the difficulty assessing that risk. Between 1935 and 1990, the FDIC charged flat deposit
insurance premiums at the rate of approximately 8.3 cents per $100 of insured deposits.”).
87. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 § 141, 105 Stat. at
2273 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A)(ii)).
88. See Richard Scott Carnell, A Partial Antidote to Perverse Incentives: The FDIC
Improvement Act of 1991, 12 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 317, 363 (1993).
89. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 § 302, 105 Stat. at
2346 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(3)(B)).
90. Rebecca N. Duffy, The Moral Hazard of Increased Deposit Insurance: What the
1980s Savings and Loan Crisis Can Teach Us About Responding to the Current Financial
Crisis, 59 DRAKE. L. REV. 559, 563 (2011).
91. Federal Deposit Insurance Funds Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 204-208, 110 Stat. 3009479 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(2)(B)).
92. Id. § 2708, 110 Stat. at 3009-497 (repealed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Reform
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 2102(b), 120 Stat. 9 (2006)).
93. See Duffy, supra note 90, at 563. For a further discussion of the issues motivating
reform during the early 2000s, see Coppola, supra note 31, at 436–48.
94. 120 Stat. 9 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
95. See id. § 2102, 120 Stat. at 9 (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(4)); see
also John L. Douglas et al., Deposit Insurance Reform Enacted, 123 BANKING L.J. 447, 448
(2006).
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the FDIC was given the power to adjust the DRR annually within the range
of 1.15 and 1.50 percent.96 Third, if the DRR exceeded 1.35 percent, the
FDIC was required to begin paying dividends to member institutions.97
Fourth, the coverage on individual retirement accounts (IRAs) was raised to
$250,000.98 Lastly, FIRA introduced a system to increase the $100,000
coverage for basic deposits based on inflation.99 This provision was
scheduled to begin in 2010, but was never utilized due to the 2008 financial
crisis.100 However, it allows the FDIC and the Board of Directors of the
National Credit Union Administration to raise the $100,000 cap every five
years to account for inflation, with the multiplier coming from the
Department of Commerce’s Personal Consumption Expenditure ChainType Price Index.101
The next significant changes to deposit insurance in the United States
came during and after the 2008 financial crisis. The Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 temporarily increased the standard minimum
deposit insurance amount (SMDIA) from $100,000 to $250,000 per
depositor.102 The Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009
extended this temporary increase.103 However, these changes were only
temporary measures aimed at creating immediate economic stability.
Significant and permanent change to deposit insurance and the operation of
the FDIC did not come until the passage of Dodd-Frank in 2010.
5. When There’s Something Wrong with Your LCFI, Who You Gonna
Call?: Dodd-Frank, Deposit Insurance, and the
Orderly Liquidation Authority
In general, Dodd-Frank’s stated goal was to end TBTF and prevent
bailouts—in other words, to deal with the problems of the implicit
government safety net.104 However, it also included key changes to the
operation of deposit insurance and the FDIC. In regards to deposit
insurance, Dodd-Frank permanently increased the SMDIA from $100,000
to $250,000, and provided for unlimited coverage on non–interest bearing
transactional accounts until December 31, 2012.105 Dodd-Frank also raised
96. Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005 § 2105, 120 Stat. at 14 (current
version at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)); see also Douglas et al., supra note 95, at 448.
97. Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005 § 2107, 120 Stat. at 16 (current
version at 12 U.S.C. § 1817 (e)); see also Douglas et al., supra note 95, at 448.
98. Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005 § 2103, 120 Stat. at 11–12 (current
version at 12 U.S.C. § 1821); see also Douglas et al., supra note 95, at 447.
99. Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005 § 2103, 120 Stat. at 10 (current
version at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(F)).
100. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
101. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(F); see also Douglas et al., supra note 95, at 449.
102. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 136, 122
Stat. 3765, 3799 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 5241 (2012)).
103. Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 204, 123
Stat. 1632, 1648–52 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5241).
104. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
105. Id. § 343, 124 Stat. at 1540 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821).
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the minimum DRR to 1.35 percent, removed any upper limit on the fund,106
and eliminated the requirement that the FDIC provide refunds when the
DRR is between 1.35 and 1.50 percent.107
Additionally, Dodd-Frank instructed the FDIC to promulgate regulations
redefining the assessment base as the average total consolidated assets of an
insured depository institution minus tangible equity.108 In 2011, pursuant to
this mandate, the FDIC finalized the implementing regulation.109 At the
same time, the FDIC also finalized new regulations altering the calculation
of assessments for large insured institutions and highly complex insured
institutions.110 Under these regulations, institutions will no longer have
their base assessment rates calculated using the four risk categories.111
Instead, they will be calculated using a scorecard that combines the
CAMELS112 rating system with other financial measures.113
Most importantly, Dodd-Frank gave the FDIC a vastly important new
power: the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA).114 Under the OLA, if
the Secretary of the Treasury, after recommendations by the Federal
Reserve Board of Governors (FRB) and the FDIC, believes that the
impending failure of a LCFI would impact the financial stability of the
United States, the Secretary can appoint the FDIC as receiver of the
institution.115 If the institution’s board does not consent to the receivership,
the Secretary can petition the D.C. District Court to impose an involuntary
one.116 The scope of judicial review is limited to whether the Secretary’s
determination that the institution is in danger of default is arbitrary and
capricious.117
Unlike when it is appointed as a receiver for a bank, the FDIC’s
receivership powers under the OLA are specifically circumscribed.118
Under the OLA, the FDIC is required to impose losses on unsecured

106. Id. § 334(a), 124 Stat. at 1539 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(3)(B)).
107. Id. § 332(d), 124 Stat. at 1539 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(e)).
108. Id. § 331(b), 124 Stat. at 1538 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1817).
109. 12 C.F.R. § 327 (2013).
110. See Assessments, Large Bank Pricing, 76 Fed. Reg. 10,672 (Feb. 25, 2011) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 327).
111. For more on the traditional four risk categories, see infra notes 146–50 and
accompanying text.
112. The CAMELS rating system is an overall rating of a bank’s condition created by
examining six specific components: capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings,
liquidity, and sensitivity market risk. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 317–18, 633–36.
113. See Assessments, Large Bank Pricing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 10,688.
114. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 202–217, 124
Stat. at 1444–520 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381–5394).
115. Id. § 203, 124 Stat. at 1450 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5383); see also Jeffrey N.
Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s Dangers and
the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151, 190–91
(2011).
116. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 202(a)(1), 124 Stat.
at 1444–45 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5382).
117. Id.
118. For banks, the FDIC’s liquidation authority is only limited by the requirement that it
pursue the least-cost resolution strategy. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
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creditors and shareholders, remove management and board members
responsible for the institution’s problems,119 and treat amounts owed to
highly compensated employees as unsecured claims.120 Additionally, the
FDIC cannot create a conservatorship or offer open bank assistance, but can
only liquidate the institution.121 However, the FDIC has broad authority to
provide financing to facilitate an institution’s liquidation.122 Funding for
the liquidation comes from the Orderly Liquidation Fund (OLF), which is
in turn funded by borrowing from the Treasury Department.123 The fund is
ultimately repaid through the sale of assets, authorized recoveries, and, if
necessary, an ex post risk-based assessment on large bank holding
companies (BHCs) and systemically important financial institutions124
(SIFIs).125
The goal of the OLA is to eliminate the necessity that regulators pick
between two equally unsavory choices when dealing with a troubled
financial institution.126
During the 2008 financial crisis, financial
regulators only had two options: allow a financial institution to fail and
hurt the economy or create a politically unpopular bailout.127 Dodd-Frank
made the OLA and FDIC receivership the only route for a troubled firm.128
The result is an orderly liquidation that prevents economic shockwaves, and
a resolution that does not use taxpayer money to save an institution from its
own mistakes.129

119. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 206, 124 Stat. at
1459 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5386).
120. Id. § 210(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 1475–76 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5390); see
also Gordon & Muller, supra note 115, at 190–94.
121. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 214(a), 124 Stat. at
1518 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5394); see also Gordon & Muller, supra note 115,
at 190–94.
122. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 204(d), 124 Stat. at
1455–56 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5384); see also Gordon & Muller, supra note
115, at 190–94.
123. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 210(n), 124 Stat. at
1506–09 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5390); see also Gordon & Muller, supra note
115, at 190–94.
124. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 210(n)–(o), 214,
124 Stat. at 1506–14, 1518 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5390, 5394); see also
Gordon & Muller, supra note 115, at 192.
125. The term SIFI in this Note refers to all institutions that are nonbank financial
institutions regulated by the FRB under Dodd-Frank. Section 113 of Dodd-Frank gives the
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) the power to subject nonbank financial
institutions to regulation by the FRB if the FSOC “determines that material financial distress
at the U.S. nonbank financial company, or the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration,
interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the U.S. nonbank financial company, could
pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States.” 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(1).
Accordingly, the term SIFI is intended to cover those institutions subjected to additional
regulation under Dodd-Frank, due to their status as nonbank financial institutions that the
FSOC has designated for FRB regulation, by virtue of their importance to the economy.
126. See Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 993.
127. Id.
128. See Gordon & Muller, supra note 115, at 152–53.
129. See Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 993.
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However, the OLA has been criticized on a number of grounds, most
prominently the lack of pre-funding for the OLF.130 In his article, The
Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-ToFail Problem, Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. articulates four reasons why failure
to pre-fund the OLF creates significant problems. First, in a time of
financial crisis precipitating the need for the OLA, it is unlikely large BHCs
and SIFIs will have the necessary funds to replenish the OLF with ex ante
assessments.131 The result will be the use of a large amount of taxpayer
funds to pay for the liquidations.132 Second, the system unfairly forces the
most prudent surviving institutions to pay for the costs of the excessive
risks of the failed institutions.133 Third, a prefunded OLF would encourage
institutions to monitor each other’s conduct in order to avoid depleting the
fund and triggering special assessments.134 Fourth, paying a risk-based
assessment to a prefunded OLF would force SIFIs to internalize the cost
that their potential failure places on the government and taxpayers.135
Furthermore, if the assessments were accurately calibrated to risk, they
would reduce moral hazard and shield the government and taxpayers from
potential exposure.136
It is also not entirely clear that the receivership system created in the
OLA is actually preferable. Jeffrey Gordon and Christopher Muller discuss
this in their article Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s Dangers
and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Relief Fund.
In a systemic emergency, stabilization of the overall financial sector may
be necessary. The mechanism available under Dodd-Frank, receiverships
imposed on multiple major financial firms on a narrow timeframe, will be
difficult to administer and will amount to government nationalization of a
large portion of the financial sector with unpredictable consequences.
Such a massive intervention is hardly the best way to avoid the breakout
of financial sector distress into the real economy. Moreover, the threat of
this strategy could accelerate the slide from financial sector instability to
financial sector crisis. An alternative approach would require recourse to
Congress for additional authority in the middle of a crisis. This strategy is
also likely to result in the breakout of the financial crisis into the real
economy. Even worse, a legislative failure in the crucible of an
emergency would be a major blow to public confidence and a genuine
catastrophe for the real economy.137

Therefore, in a financial crisis, assisting struggling institutions or bailing
them out may be more effective in preventing a crisis than OLA

130. Earlier versions of the legislation did provide for a prefunded OLF, but Republican
resistance to the idea resulted in it being removed from the final legislation. Id. at 1015–17.
131. Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 1015–20.
132. Id. at 1015–20.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1020–22.
137. See Gordon & Muller, supra note 115, at 204.
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receivership.138 Gordon and Muller thus propose that direct assistance
should be provided to firms in a time of crisis through a prefunded systemic
emergency relief fund.139
B. I’ll Be Watching You: The Current Operation of Federally Sponsored
Deposit Insurance in the United States
What is clear from the discussion in Part I.A is that, in the approximate
eighty years since its inception, federally sponsored deposit insurance in the
United States has undergone a number of complex changes. Therefore, this
section offers a concise description of the current state of the law, and the
processes by which the FDIC operates. The FDIC is an independent agency
of the federal government, and FDIC insurance covers all deposit accounts
including checking, savings, and money market deposit accounts.140 The
current level of insurance is $250,000 per depositor, per insured bank, for
each account ownership category.141 In the event of a bank failure, a
depositor at an FDIC-insured bank is typically able to recover their funds
quickly with little delay.142 The FDIC does not cover many of the other
financial products that banks offer like stocks, bonds, life insurance
policies, and securities.143
FDIC deposit insurance coverage is provided by the DIF.144 The DIF is
funded by premiums paid by insured depository institutions, typically
banks.145 These premiums are calculated by multiplying an institution’s
assessment rate by its assessment base.146 For many institutions, the
assessment rate is determined by a number of factors. The most important
factor is which of four possible risk categories the insured institution falls
into.147 Category I is the lowest risk and Category IV is the highest. The
FDIC’s designation of an institution into a risk category is primarily based
on capital148 levels and the FDIC’s evaluations of the institution.149 Once a
138. Id.
139. See Gordon & Muller, supra note 115, at 204–05.
140. Deposit Insurance Summary, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/
deposits/dis/index.html (last updated Oct. 17, 2013).
141. See id.; see also FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 70–72 (discussing the
complex rules regarding ownership categories).
142. See George G. Kaufman & Steven A. Seelig, Post-resolution Treatment of
Depositors at Failed Banks: Implications for the Severity of Banking Crises, Systemic Risk,
and Too-Big-To-Fail 8 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 83, 2001). But see FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 83–85 (noting delays may occur in paying deposits).
143. Deposit Insurance Summary, supra note 140.
144. The Deposit Insurance Fund, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/
insurance/index.html (last updated Aug. 29, 2013).
145. See Deposit Insurance Summary, supra note 140.
146. Assessments, Large Bank Pricing, 76 Fed. Reg. 10,672, 10,673 (Feb. 25, 2011) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 327).
147. See id. at 10,672–73.
148. For banks, capital is the firm’s net worth or equity. A firm’s equity is essentially all
that would be left if it paid off all of its creditors. Accordingly, it equals the firm’s total
assets minus the firm’s total liabilities. Capital is important because the more capital a bank
has, or the more that its assets exceed its liabilities, the more likely it is to be able to pay
back its creditors. Total capital, or total equity, is Tier 1 capital plus Tier 2 capital. Tier 1
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risk category is determined, the final assessment rate is calculated after
factoring in a number of other adjustments.150 The assessment base is
determined by subtracting the institution’s average tangible equity from the
institution’s average consolidated total assets.151
The system operates differently for large insured institutions152 and
highly complex institutions.153 For these institutions, base assessment rates
are not calculated using risk categories, but instead using a scorecard that
combines the CAMELS rating system with other financial measures.154
Once the base assessment rate is calculated, the FDIC reserves the right to
adjust it based on significant factors not captured in the scorecards.155 The
scorecards are different for large insured institutions and highly complex
institutions.156
By law, the minimum designated reserve ratio of the DIF cannot fall
below 1.35 percent of estimated insured deposits.157 If it does, the FDIC is
required to adopt a restoration plan to restore its funds.158 There is no cap
on how high the DRR may be, and the FDIC may determine the appropriate
level every year.159 However, if the DRR exceeds 1.50 percent of
estimated insured deposits, the FDIC is permitted to, but not required to,
issue dividends to insured institutions.160
In the event that an insured depository institution fails or is closed by its
primary regulator,161 the FDIC may take a number of actions. First, in
almost every case, the process begins with the FDIC being appointed as
receiver of a failed bank.162 Second, the FDIC must decide between the use
capital is more permanent, reliable, and resilient, and consists of specific types of equity.
Tier 2 capital is everything else that qualifies as capital, and it is less preferable. See
CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 252–65.
149. See Assessments, Large Bank Pricing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 10,672.
150. See id. at 10,672–73.
151. See id. at 10,678.
152. These are banks with $10 billion or more in total assets in December 2006, or for
four consecutive quarters since then. See id. at 10,674 n.15.
153. These are banks with $50 billion or more in total assets that have a relationship with
another U.S. company with assets of $500 billion or more. See id. at 10,688 n.52.
154. See id. at 10,688.
155. See id. at 10,699.
156. See id. at 10,689, 10,695.
157. See id. at 10,673; see also The Deposit Insurance Fund, supra note 144.
158. The Deposit Insurance Fund, supra note 144.
159. See Assessments, Large Bank Pricing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 10,673.
160. See id. at 10,673–74; see also The Deposit Insurance Fund, supra note 144.
161. For example, a bank’s primary federal regulator may close a bank and place it in
conservatorship or receivership because it is severely undercapitalized and has not complied
with the requirements set forth in the FDICIA. See Carnell, supra note 88, at 327–28
(discussing in depth the function and difficulty of defining the least-cost rule).
162. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 83 (“When a national bank is closed, the
FDIC is automatically appointed receiver by the Comptroller of the Currency. When an
insured state bank is closed, a receiver is appointed according to state law . . . . [I]t is the
exception when the FDIC is not appointed.”); see also CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 694
(“The FDIC pays insured claims from the insurance fund and recoups what it can by selling
the failed bank’s assets. The more efficient the resolution process, the smaller the FDIC’s
loss. By acting as the failed bank’s receiver, the FDIC controls the process and has an
opportunity to minimize its own loss.”).
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of two processes, broadly described as the payout method and the purchase
and assumption method (P&A method).163 By law, the FDIC is required to
use whatever process would be the least costly in that instance.164 In the
payout method, the FDIC pays off insured deposits directly, and “becomes
a creditor of the receivership for the amount it advances.”165 The FDIC
receivership then liquidates the bank’s assets, attempting to get the highest
price possible to refund itself and the other creditors.166 In the P&A
method, the FDIC engineers a sale of the deposits and loans of the failed
institution to another institution.167 “Customers of the failed institution
automatically become customers of the assuming institution . . . [and] the
transition is seamless from the customer’s point of view.”168
Lastly, there are two ways the FDIC may take action before an insured
institution is closed or fails. First, the FDIC has the power to provide
assistance to banks through loans or purchase of assets.169 Second, the
FDIC has the power to facilitate a merger or acquisition of a failing bank by
making loans, purchasing assets, and providing guarantees.170
C. It’s the End of the World As We Know It: The Rise of
the Modern TBTF LCFIs
Today, many of the commercial banks insured by the FDIC are part of
LCFIs and are legally organized under the umbrella of Financial Holding
Companies (FHCs).171 These affiliations were initially prohibited under the
Banking Act of 1933, colloquially referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act
(GSA), which forced the separation of commercial banking from
investment banking (i.e., securities firms).172 Specifically, section 20 of the
GSA prohibited member banks from affiliating with a business “engaged
principally” in investment banking.173 The separation between commercial
and investment banks was later strengthened in 1956 by the Bank Holding
Company Act (BHCA) requirement that BHCs, or companies owning or
controlling banks, could not own or control any company that was not a

163. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 81–88.
164. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 694; see also Carnell, supra note 88, at 363–
67.
165. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 85.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 87–94; see also CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 731 (noting the difficult
statutory requirements the FDIC must overcome to provide open bank assistance).
168. Who Is the FDIC?, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/
symbol/index.html (last updated Jan. 18, 2013).
169. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 94–97.
170. Id. at 81.
171. Wilmarth, supra note 18, at 220.
172. See Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.); see also CARPENTER & MURPHY, supra note 14, at 6.
173. See Banking Act of 1933 § 20, 48 Stat. at 188–89, repealed by Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101(a), 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999); see also CARPENTER &
MURPHY, supra note 14, at 6.
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bank or engaged in an activity not related to banking.174 These prohibitions
remained unchallenged for several decades as many strongly believed that
the connection between commercial banking and securities firms had led to
the Great Depression.175
This view began to change in the late 1970s and early 1980s.176 High
interest rates drove consumers to put their funds in interest bearing
accounts,177 businesses began to rely on securitization for short term
funding,178 and new competitors entered the market.179 Banks suddenly
found their market share180 and profits181 steadily dropping, and they put
pressure on their regulators to ease the restrictions imposed by the GSA.
While the Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) responded by
allowing commercial banks to engage in a wider variety of financial
activities,182 the FRB responded by allowing ever more complex corporate
combinations between banks and other financial entities. Supported by the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System v. Investment Co. Institute,183 the FRB declared that bank
subsidiaries could engage in activities involving certain bank ineligible
securities without violating section 20, as long as these activities did not
Over time, the
exceed a certain percentage of gross revenue.184
requirements became increasingly liberal,185 and by 1996 the FRB had
essentially allowed any large bank to affiliate with any large securities

174. See Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 4, 70 Stat. 133,
135–37 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (2012)).
175. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Did Universal Banks Play a Significant Role in the U.S.
Economy’s Boom-and-Bust Cycle of 1921–33? A Preliminary Assessment, 4 CURRENT
DEVS. MONETARY & FIN. L. 559, 590–91 (2005).
176. See CARPENTER & MURPHY, supra note 14, at 8.
177. Depositors shifted huge amounts of funds into money market mutual funds
(MMMFs) that offer considerably higher yields to investors and many of the advantages of
bank accounts such as demand withdrawal and check writing. See Wilmarth, supra note 18,
at 239–40 & n.95.
178. See CARPENTER & MURPHY, supra note 14, at 8.
179. See WOLFGANG H. REINICKE, BANKING, POLITICS AND GLOBAL FINANCE 57 (1995).
180. Id. at 57, 95.
181. See CARPENTER & MURPHY, supra note 14, at 8.
182. See id. at 10; see also Eligibility of Securities for Purchase, Dealing in Underwriting
and Holding by National Banks; Rulings Issued by the Comptroller, 47 Fed. Reg. 18,323
(Apr. 29, 1982) (current version at 12 C.F.R. ch. 1, pt. 1 (2013)).
183. 450 U.S. 46 (1981). The Court held that the FRB’s determination of what
constituted the business of banking under the BHCA was entitled to great deference. Id. at
56–58. It also found that the FRB’s decision to allow bank subsidiaries to engage in certain
investment activities did not violate the GSA, which only applied to banks and not
subsidiaries. Id. at 63–65; see also MELANIE L. FEIN, SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF BANKS 4-55
to -56 (3d ed. 2011) (stating that the holding effectively meant that bank affiliates or
subsidiaries could legally engage in activities prohibited for banks themselves).
184. Orders Issued Under Section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act, 73 FED. RES.
BULL. 473, 475–77 (1987).
185. Regulation Y Amendment, 75 FED. RES. BULL. 751 (1989) (doubling the revenue
requirement to 10 percent); see also REINICKE, supra note 179, at 114.
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firm.186 In 1998, the FRB approved the merger between Citibank and
Travelers, making Citibank the largest banking organization in the world
and allowing it to offer a full range of financial services.187 Finally, in
1999, Congress overwhelmingly passed,188 and President Clinton signed
into law, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA).189 The GLBA effectively
removed the barriers separating commercial banks, securities firms, and
insurance companies, principally by repealing section 20 of the GSA and
relevant provisions of the BHCA.190 The era of the large complex financial
institution was born.191
D. Can’t Touch This: Sections 23A and 23B and the
Rules of Separation Between Banks and FHC Affiliates
Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act restrict the interactions
between commercial banks and their affiliates and subsidiaries.192 Section
23A193 was enacted as part of the Banking Act of 1933194 in order to
protect federally insured depository institutions from excessive exposure to
their riskier affiliates, and to prevent transfer of the federal subsidy to nondepository institutions.195 Section 23B196 was enacted in 1987 as part of
the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987197 to provide further
protection in anticipation of the expanded securities powers being granted
to banks and BHCs.198
Both 23A and 23B define an affiliate as any company that controls the
bank and any company that is controlled by such company.199 Financial

186. Letter from Marc E. Lackritz, President, Sec. Indus. Ass’n, to William W. Wiles,
Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Sept. 30, 1996), available at
http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=461.
187. See Press Release, Fed. Reserve, Announcing Conditional Approval of the
Merger Between Travelers and Citigroup (Sept. 23, 1998), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bhc/1998/19980923/19980923.pdf.
188. See Daniel Parks, Financial Services Overhaul Bill Clears After Final Skirmishing
over Community Reinvestment, 57 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2654 (1999).
189. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
190. Id. § 101(a), 113 Stat. at 1341; FEIN, supra note 183, at 1-42.
191. See FEIN, supra note 183, at 1-43. Fein notes that much of the consolidation took
place before the passage of the GLBA. See id. The GLBA is still notable, however, for
removing any doubts as to the legality of LCFIs and providing an actual legal framework for
them. See id.
192. The FRB has also issued Regulation W to help implement sections 23A and 23B.
Regulation W also provides an array of specifics as to how these sections should operate. See
12 C.F.R. § 223 (2013).
193. 12 U.S.C. § 371c (2012).
194. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 13, 48 Stat. 162, 183 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 371c).
195. See Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled
Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683, 1686 (2011).
196. 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1.
197. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 102, 101 Stat.
552, 564–66 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1).
198. See FEIN, supra note 183, at 2-36.
199. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b).
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subsidiaries of the banks themselves also are considered affiliates.200
Sections 23A and 23B similarly define covered transactions201 to include
extending credit to an affiliate, purchasing or investing in the securities or
derivatives of an affiliate, accepting the affiliate’s securities as collateral for
any extension of credit, and guaranteeing obligations of the affiliate.202
Under section 23A, all covered transactions must be on terms and
conditions “consistent with safe and sound banking practices.”203 Section
23A also places an overall limit of 20 percent on the total amount of credit a
bank may extend to its affiliates204 and a 10 percent limit on credit extended
to any specific affiliate.205 Extensions of credit are required to be secured
by collateral according to a specific formula.206 Furthermore, section 23A
also prohibits banks from purchasing certain low-quality assets from an
affiliate.207
Section 23B provides a general requirement that all transactions with
affiliates, including covered transactions, be at arms length.208 This means
that the transaction must be on the same terms as the bank would require for
a nonaffiliated company, at a similar time, in a similar transaction.209 If
there is no comparable transaction, it must be on terms that in good faith
would be offered to a nonaffiliated company.210 Section 23B also imposes
the arms length requirement on securities sales by a bank to an affiliate,
payment of money or services to or from an affiliate, and any transactions
between the bank and a third party in which the affiliate has a financial
interest.211 Lastly, under section 23B, a bank is barred from publishing any
advertisement or entering into an agreement suggesting that it is responsible
for the obligations of affiliates.212
The OCC, FRB, and FDIC all have statutory power to grant exemptions
from section 23A to their respective institutions for a transaction.213 The
requirement for an exemption is that it be in the public interest and related
to the purpose of section 23A.214 The OCC and FRB are required to notify
the FDIC before an exemption, and give it sixty days to object in writing if
it finds the action presents a risk to the DIF.215

200.
201.
202.
at 23.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. § 371c-1(d).
See id. §§ 371c(b)(7), 371c-1(b).
See id.; 12 C.F.R § 223.3(h) (2013); see also CARPENTER & MURPHY, supra note 14,
12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(4).
Id. § 371c(a)(1)(B).
Id. § 371c(a)(1)(A).
Id. § 371c(c).
Id. § 371c(a)(3).
Id. § 371c-1.
Id. § 371c-1(a)(1)(A).
Id. § 371c-1(a)(1)(B).
Id. § 371c-1(a)(2).
Id. § 371c-1(c).
Id. § 371c(f).
Id.
Id. § 371c(f)(2).
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II. GOVERNMENT-INSURED GAMBLING: THE PROBLEMS
WITH DEPOSIT INSURANCE
As detailed in Part I, the U.S. scheme of federally sponsored deposit
insurance was created with the goal of protecting depositors and creating
stability in the banking system.216 While a federally sponsored deposit
insurance structure may help to achieve those goals, some of the negative
consequences of such a system may also work to undermine them. This
Part describes the problems created by having a federally sponsored system
of deposit insurance. Part II.A discusses these problems generally, Part II.B
offers specific examples from the recent past, and Part II.C examines
whether the post–2008 financial crisis legislation has substantively
improved any of these issues.
A. I Knew You Were Trouble When You Walked in: How Deposit
Insurance Creates Moral Hazard and Economic Instability
The principal issue created by any insurance system is moral hazard.217
Moral hazard can best be described as “[t]he tendency of an insured to relax
his efforts to prevent the occurrence of the risk that he has insured against
because he has shifted the risk to an insurance company.”218 In the deposit
insurance context, this means that depositors who are insured against loss
are no longer concerned that a bank acting imprudently may lose its
funds.219 Accordingly, depositors are no longer incentivized to monitor
their banks’ activities.220
This removes what would be two powerful restraints on a bank’s
activities: bank runs and higher interest rates. Absent deposit insurance, if
depositors believed a bank was taking excessively risky actions with their
funds, they would either withdraw their funds (potentially initiating a bank
run)221 or demand higher interest rates.222 But once deposit insurance
makes depositor concerns irrelevant, banks no longer have to worry about
bank runs223 and can raise funds from depositors at a substantially lower
cost.224 This leaves banks free to assume more risk.225

216. See supra Part I.
217. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 327 (describing all the issues insurance
creates for private insurers because of moral hazard).
218. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 121 (5th ed. 1998).
219. See Carnell, supra note 88, at 319–21.
220. Id.
221. See Kaufman, supra note 30, at 23–24.
222. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 293.
223. See Kaufman, supra note 30, at 23–24.
224. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 293; see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The
Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime
Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 977–79 (2009).
225. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 293–94; see also Steven L. Schwarcz,
Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 211 (2008).
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The cost of that risk, which the bank would have borne itself through
having to pay higher interest rates to depositors,226 is then shifted to DIF
and the federal government that unequivocally backs it.227 In addition,
deposit insurance, along with the other elements of the explicit federal
safety net, allows banks to borrow funds at substantially lower interest
rates.228 Thus, deposit insurance in the United States ultimately creates a
federal subsidy that allows banks to access artificially cheap funds,229
which, again, can make it easier for banks to engage in higher levels of risk
taking.230
The government attempts to restrain banks and LCFIs from taking
advantage of this federal subsidy and from engaging in excessively risky
activity through a variety of measures231: (1) a system of regulatory
oversight232 and capital requirements to restrain banks’ risk taking,233 (2) a
system of risk-based premiums to attempt to shift the cost of risk from the
DIF back to banks,234 and (3) sections 23A and 23B to prevent the spread
of the subsidy to other nonbank financial institutions.235 However, history
has demonstrated that these measures are often inadequate and
ineffective,236 and continue to allow deposit insurance to provide an
incentive for banks to engage in excessive risk taking. This risk taking, it
has been argued, can in turn result in increased banking instability,
increased likelihood of a banking crisis, and the increased likelihood of
larger economic crisis.237
B. Memories of the Way We Were: Examples of Deposit
Insurance’s Negative Repercussions
Part II.B.1, II.B.2, and II.B.3 will give specific examples of the negative
repercussions that deposit insurance has had on the financial system.

226. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 293; see also Wilmarth, supra note 224, at
977–79.
227. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 309.
228. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Narrow Banking: An Overdue Reform That Could
Solve the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem and Align U.S. and U.K. Financial Regulation of
Financial Conglomerates (Part II), BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP., Apr. 2012, at 1, 5.
229. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 309.
230. See Schwarcz, supra note 225, at 211.
231. See Zachary J. Gubler, Regulating in the Shadows: Systemic Moral Hazard and the
Problem of the Twenty-First Century Bank Run, 63 ALA. L. REV. 221, 233 (2012).
232. See Kam Hon Chu, Deposit Insurance and Banking Stability, 31 CATO J. 99, 105
(2011) (noting that deposit insurance, by removing depositors as monitors, creates the need
for regulatory oversight).
233. See Gubler, supra note 231, at 233.
234. See id.
235. See Omarova, supra note 195, at 1687; Wilmarth, supra note 18, at 456.
236. See Gubler, supra note 231, at 233.
237. See Kam Hon Chu, Deposit Insurance and Banking Crises in the Short and Long
Run, 23 CATO J. 265, 277 (2003) (concluding that deposit insurance does not make the
occurrence of bank crises less likely in the long run, and may actually increase that
likeliness).
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1. Our House, with Two Cats in the Yard, and a Mortgage We Cannot Pay:
Nonprime Lending and Deposit Insurance
As an example of the ability of deposit insurance to encourage excessive
risk taking and contribute to financial crisis, some commentators have
pointed to its role in nonprime lending in the early 2000s. Nonprime home
mortgages are inherently risky because they are offered to people with bad
credit, who pose a greater risk of default and do not qualify for prime
mortgages.238 Additionally, the risk of these mortgages increased over the
course of the early 2000s as lending standards deteriorated.239 Despite this
risk, the volume of nonprime mortgages grew from $250 billion to
$1 trillion between 2001 and 2006.240 Nearly 10 million nonprime
mortgages were originated between 2003 and mid-2007.241 Furthermore,
depository institutions and their subsidiaries and affiliates originated 79
percent of those.242
Banks kept originating these high-risk loans because they were making
substantial profits from the loan fees and subsequent securitization.243
These profits were attainable because deposit insurance allowed banks to
raise money cheaply to fund these loans regardless of their risk.244
Recognizing the advantages of this system, even securities firms that were
not initially banks sought to acquire insured depository institutions.245 For
example, in 2003, Merrill Lynch relied on FDIC-insured bank deposits to
provide 51 percent of its funding for commercial and consumer loans.246
This boom in nonprime lending was ultimately catastrophic for the
financial industry and the overall economy. Many analysts blame the 2008
financial crisis on the collapse of the housing market and the subsequent
loss in value of the myriad financial products that based their value on that
market.247 Much of the expansion in the housing market in the run-up to
the crisis was driven by the growth in nonprime home mortgages.248 By
2009, commercial and investment banks had suffered more than $910
billion in losses related to these loans and many required bailouts.249

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

See Wilmarth, supra note 224, at 1015–16.
See id. at 1020.
See id. at 970.
Id.
See id. at 1018–19.
See id. at 970–72.
See id. at 977–80.
Id.
See id. at 977 n.46.
See id. at 970.
See id. at 1015–16.
See id. at 1044.
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2. Tell Me Have You Ever Really, Really Ever Loved a Derivative?:
How Deposit Insurance Encouraged Speculative
Derivatives Trading at Banks
Deposit insurance also played a role in helping banks grow their
derivatives business in the lead-up to the 2008 financial crisis, providing
another example of the ability of deposit insurance to contribute to financial
crises. The OCC permits national banks to originate, deal, and trade in a
wide variety of derivatives as part of the business of banking.250 Normally,
a derivative is “simply a contract between two parties whose value is based
on changes in an interest rate, currency, or almost anything else.”251 The
primary use of derivatives is to protect or hedge against loss from market
risk.252
In the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis, banks were also permitted to
use derivatives to incur risk when speculating on their own account.253 In
addition, many of these were over-the-counter (OTC) and financial
derivatives that could be tailored to mimic the risk and return profiles of
fundamental securities like stocks and bonds, and thus were subject to the
same types of risks as traditional securities.254 These derivatives were also
subject to additional risks.255 They were more complex and harder to value
than traditional securities,256 and subject to possible mass default if the
price in the underlying asset suddenly changed.257 Additionally, many of
these derivatives were highly leveraged, allowing them to create potential
losses that far exceeded the holder’s investment.258
Despite these risks, in the run-up to the financial crisis, banks used OTC
derivatives extensively to earn fees and generate profits through proprietary
trading.259 “At the end of 2000, the seven most active bank dealers in the
United States held derivatives with total notional values of more than $38
trillion, seven times the volume they held in 1990,” and “OTC derivatives
accounted for more than four-fifths of the derivative portfolios.”260 Big
banks also dominated the derivatives trade, with seven of them holding
approximately 96 percent of all derivatives held by U.S. banks in 2000.261

250. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ACTIVITIES PERMISSIBLE FOR A NATIONAL BANK,
CUMULATIVE 57 (2012), available at http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-bytype/other-publications-reports/bankact.pdf.
251. DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT
AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 60 (2011).
252. See JAMES HAMILTON ET AL., A GUIDE TO FEDERAL REGULATION OF DERIVATIVES
110–11 (1998).
253. See FEIN, supra note 183, at SR-26; HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 252, at 111.
254. See Wilmarth, supra note 18, at 337–38.
255. Id. at 338.
256. Id. at 350.
257. Id. at 368.
258. Id.
259. See id. at 337.
260. See id. at 334–35.
261. Id. at 334.
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Banks were largely able to grow and dominate this business because of
the significant advantages they enjoyed from the implicit federal safety net
and from deposit insurance.262 First, whenever a bank failed in the past,
regulators had always ensured its outstanding derivatives contracts were
honored.263 In a complicated market like the one that exists for OTC
derivatives,264 the expectation among investors that the default risk is less
with banks is a substantial advantage.265 Second, as in the case of
nonprime lending, deposit insurance provided banks access to low-cost
funds they could utilize to engage in derivative trading, independent of the
risks of those activities.266 This, in turn, allowed for higher profits from
those activities.267 Thus, deposit insurance, in conjunction with the implicit
safety net of bailouts, allowed banks to dominate and profit in the high-risk
derivatives trade.268
In search of the increasing profits that derivatives could provide, banks in
the years preceding the financial crisis increasingly pursued derivatives
activities based on nonprime mortgages.269 As a result, banks became
exposed to multiple layers of risk dependent on the performance of an
already high-risk asset.270 Thus, when the housing bubble ultimately burst,
the derivative activities of banks contributed to their incurrence of even
greater losses.271
3. All in All, It’s Just Another Leak in the Wall: The Use of the Deposit
Insurance Subsidy To Fund FHC Affiliates
Another example of the problems created by deposit insurance is the
inability of the government to contain the federal subsidy to banks within
FHCs. As discussed in Part I.E, the purposes of section 23A are to protect
federally insured depository institutions from excessive exposure to their
riskier affiliates, and to prevent the transfer of the federal subsidy to
nondepository institutions.272 The government also has wide discretion to
waive section 23A’s requirements for specific transactions.273 In her article
From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled Promise of
Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, Professor Saule T. Omarova argues
that the ineffective use of this authority has severely undermined section

262. Id. at 336–37, 372–73.
263. See id. at 373.
264. See id. at 336 (describing how the market for OTC derivatives is a difficult one for
investors because they do not utilize standardized terms, are not traded on an organized
market, and are not protected from default risks by clearinghouse guarantees).
265. See id. at 373.
266. See Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 1044–45.
267. See Wilmarth, supra note 18, at 337.
268. See id. at 373.
269. See Wilmarth, supra note 224, at 991–95, 1028–34.
270. See id. at 1034.
271. See id. at 1043–44.
272. See Omarova, supra note 195, at 1686.
273. See id. at 1699–1702.
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23A’s implementation, and allowed the federal subsidy to effectively
subsidize the activities not just of banks but of LCFIs themselves.274
Professor Omarova offers a number of examples. She describes how, in
the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, the FRB granted a number
of waivers for LCFIs to reorganize their assets on the grounds that this
would increase their efficiency and profitability.275 While the FRB
continued to require that FDIC-insured banks not be saddled with lowquality assets (and when they were, required appropriate compensation to
be given),276 Professor Omarova suggests the FRB did not understand the
true purpose of the LCFIs’ actions.277
Citing Citibank as an example, she describes how LCFIs used these
waivers to place large amounts of nonprime mortgages that originated in
uninsured affiliates within their FDIC-insured affiliates.278 By doing this,
LCFIs could capitalize on the advantages that their FDIC-insured affiliates
enjoyed in creating and selling derivatives based on these mortgages.279
Thus, these waivers essentially allowed LCFIs to saddle their FDIC-insured
banks, and consequently the DIF, with increased risk so they could generate
greater profits by utilizing the federal subsidy provided to their banks.280
In another example, Professor Omarova details how, in late 2007, when
the securities market was hit by the shock of the subprime fallout, the FRB
allowed several FDIC-insured banks to extend credit to their affiliated
“This was an extraordinary set of
securities broker dealers.281
decisions,”282 Professor Omarova writes. “Never before had the [FRB]
removed the quantitative and qualitative requirements of section 23A, on
such a massive scale, in order to prop up broader markets in distress.”283
The FRB’s actions allowed LCFIs to use the cheap federally subsidized
funds of their bank subsidiaries to bail out their securities affiliates, who
were suffering for their high-risk activities. This was exactly what section
23A had been designed to prevent.284
C. Don’t Go Changing To Try and Please Me: How Dodd-Frank Did
Little To Improve the Issues Associated with Deposit Insurance
After the financial crisis, the federal government initiated sweeping
reforms of the banking and financial services industries through the passage
of Dodd-Frank. Among other things, Dodd-Frank altered the calculation of
274. See id. at 1699–1703; see also Wilmarth, supra note 18, at 456 (describing how
sometimes LCFIs simply ignore section 23A’s requirements and are never discovered).
275. See id. at 1708–17.
276. See id. at 1704.
277. See id. at 1709.
278. See id.
279. See id. at 1716; see also supra notes 264–68 and accompanying text (describing in
detail the advantages banks have in the derivatives market).
280. See Omarova, supra note 195, at 1716.
281. See id. at 1730.
282. See id. at 1732.
283. See id.
284. See id. at 1732–33.
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FDIC premiums, increased banks’ capital requirements,285 and prevented
LCFIs from engaging in certain types of high-risk activities if they operated
an FDIC-insured bank.286 However, it is unclear whether these changes
will actually rectify the problems discussed in Part II.A and II.B. DoddFrank’s goal was to eliminate the implicit safety net of federal bailouts
created by the existence of TBTF LCFIs,287 and thus many of its changes
reflect that objective and do not seek to correct issues with deposit
insurance itself. Dodd-Frank also relies on regulatory strategies that have
proved problematic in the past,288 and its bans on certain types of activities
contain significant loopholes that may undermine their effectiveness.289
As described in Part I.A.5, Dodd-Frank altered the way the FDIC
calculates its premiums. Proponents believe the new system is beneficial
because it more accurately reflects risk.290 However, opponents have
criticized the changes because they disproportionately impact larger
banks,291 ignoring the fact that smaller banks also played a significant role
in fueling the 2008 financial crisis.292
Dodd-Frank and the Basel III regulations293 also required that the United
States implement new rules for bank capital including increasing capital

285. See infra notes 294–304 and accompanying text.
286. See infra notes 301–02 and accompanying text.
287. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, pmbl., 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (stating that the Act’s purpose is “[t]o promote the
financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the
financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, [sic] to protect the American taxpayer by ending
bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other
purposes”).
288. See Gubler, supra note 231, at 239.
289. See infra notes 298–313 and accompanying text.
290. See Peter S. Kim, The FDIC’s Special Assessment: Basing Deposit Insurance on
Assets Instead of Deposits, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 381, 389–97 (2010) (noting that basing
assessments on assets instead of deposits penalizes larger banks, but may represent a better
reflection of risk); Mark Gongloff & Min Zeng, New Fee Shakes Up a Lending Market,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 5, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB200014240527
48703712504576242542837822736.html (“The new assessment was designed to better
reflect the risks on individual banks’ balance sheets by charging them for liabilities,
including repo-market activities, instead of just their deposits.”).
291. Calculating the assessment base using assets instead of deposits will
disproportionately affect larger banks because the assets of these banks typically exceed
deposits. See Kim, supra note 290, at 390–91.
292. See id. at 393.
293. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is a group of regulators from several
countries that sets uniform international standards for banking regulation, most notably,
capital requirements. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2013). These standards are
nonbinding and must be adopted individually by the member countries. See Narissa Lyngen,
Basel III: Dynamics of State Implementation, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 519, 519–20 (2012).
Previously, the Basel Committee issued global financial regulations through the Basel I and
Basel II Accords, which were widely adopted by member countries. Id. In 2010, in response
to the abuses that led to the financial crisis, the Basel Committee issued a new group of
global financial regulations known as Basel III. Id. Many of these regulations require banks
to hold more and higher quality capital, and have begun to be implemented in the United
States by bank regulatory authorities. See Press Release, Fed. Reserve, Announcing
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requirements and adjusting formulas.294 Again, the majority of these
changes were aimed at forcing LCFIs to hold more capital in order to
ameliorate the problem of TBTF.295 These reforms have also been
criticized on the grounds that the failure of past capital requirements to
restrain bank’s risk taking casts doubt on whether these new rules will be
any more effective than in the past.296
Dodd-Frank also adjusted the system of granting section 23A waivers by
requiring notification to the FDIC and OCC of potential waivers, and giving
those agencies an opportunity to object. However, Dodd-Frank did not
make any changes to section 23A to deal with its complexity or the fact that
banks deliberately violate its prohibitions.297 In addition, there is already
evidence to suggest that the changes to the waiver system have been
ineffective. In 2011, despite the FDIC’s objection, the FRB allowed Bank
of America (BOA) to move an undisclosed amount of its derivative
financial instruments from its Merrill Lynch unit to its commercial banking
subsidiary.298 This allowed BOA to avoid $3.3 billion in collateral
requirements by transferring the risk of those derivatives to the DIF and
taking advantage of the FDIC-insured subsidiaries’ higher credit rating.299
The provisions of Dodd-Frank that have the greatest potential to prevent
banks from taking advantage of the explicit safety net of deposit insurance
and moral hazard are the Volcker rule and the Lincoln Amendment.
Section 619 of Dodd-Frank, popularly known as the Volcker rule, prohibits
banks, their affiliates, and BHCs from engaging in proprietary trading.300
Proprietary trading occurs when banks buy and sell securities, derivatives,
and other tradable assets for their own account.301 More specifically, the
bank uses its balance sheet, partly funded by government-insured deposits,
to take speculative positions for its own profit.302 Thus, the Volcker rule,
by banning proprietary trading, seeks to prohibit banks and their affiliates
from engaging in high-risk speculative activities.303 This means banks and
their affiliates can no longer take advantage of moral hazard and
government-subsidized funds to engage in those activities.
However, the Volcker rule contains a significant loophole, permitting
banks to engage in “market making”—or the purchase and sale of securities
Approval of Final Rule To Ensure Banks Maintain Strong Capital Positions (July 2, 2013),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20130702a.htm.
294. See Press Release, supra note 293.
295. Id.
296. See Wilmarth, supra note 228, at 12–13.
297. Wilmarth, supra note 18, at 4.
298. Jonathan Weil, Bank of America Bosses Find Friend in the Fed: Jonathan Weil,
BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-1019/bank-of-america-bosses-find-friend-in-the-fed-jonathan-weil.html.
299. See Wilmarth, supra note 228, at 4.
300. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620–31 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012)).
301. See Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 1025.
302. See RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES: HOW HIDDEN FRACTURES STILL THREATEN
THE WORLD ECONOMY 173 (2010).
303. See Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 1026.
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and other instruments on behalf of customers304—as well as risk-mitigating
hedging activities.305 Distinguishing between banned proprietary trading
and permitted market making is notoriously difficult, and could potentially
make it easier for banks to evade the rule.306 Also, as the London Whale
incident exemplifies, banks can still engage in highly speculative activities
and make large profits in the name of hedging.307 Indeed, both regulators
and JP Morgan agreed that the bank’s actions did not violate the Volcker
rule.308 Lastly, the Volcker rule can also be criticized on the grounds that it
takes a flawed approach by only altering activities and not incentives, and
therefore does little to actually prevent banks and FHCs from taking
excessively damaging risks.309
The Lincoln Amendment forces FDIC-insured banks to spin off their
derivative activities, only allowing them to use swaps, a type of derivative,
for hedging or risk mitigating.310 It also limits the type of swaps to those
for interest rates, currency rates, and other activities permissible for a bank,
and only allows credit default swaps that are cleared.311 Yet, the Lincoln
Amendment also contains significant loopholes. It allows banks to continue
trading and dealing in a variety of OTC and other derivatives that are not
subject to Dodd-Frank’s clearing requirement,312 and grandfathers swaps
executed through July 2013.313 Some commentators now estimate that the
Lincoln Amendment will have little impact on the derivatives activities of
banks and LCFIs.314
III. YOU SAY YOU WANT A REAL SOLUTION: POSSIBILITIES FOR
SOLVING THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY DEPOSIT INSURANCE
What Part II reveals is that there is significant evidence that the federally
subsidized funds provided by deposit insurance helped contribute to the
2008 financial crisis. At the same time, Part II.C.3 raises a question as to
whether the post-2008 reforms actually did anything to solve any of the

304. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 619, 124 Stat. at
1623–24 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1851).
305. Id.
306. See Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 1029.
307. See Silver-Greenberg & Craig, supra note 3.
308. See Patterson, supra note 9.
309. RAJAN, supra note 302, at 173.
310. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, §§ 701–720, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641–58 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 8301–8325
(Supp. 2012)); see also Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 1033.
311. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 701–720, 124
Stat. at 1641–58 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 8301–8325); see also Wilmarth,
supra note 10, at 1033.
312. See Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 1034.
313. See Steve Schaefer, Dodd-Frank’s Derivatives Curbs Won’t Be a Problem for Big
Banks, Fitch Says, FORBES (June 5, 2012, 2:09 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
steveschaefer/2012/06/05/dodd-franks-derivatives-curbs-wont-be-a-problem-for-big-banksfitch-says/.
314. Id.; see also Christine Harper & Bradley Keoun, The New Rules Won’t Stop the Next
Crisis, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, July 5–11, 2010, at 42–43.
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problems created by deposit insurance. Accordingly, Part III presents and
examines a number of reforms that could improve the system of deposit
insurance in the United States. The reforms can be broadly separated into
three categories. Part III.A covers reforms to deposit insurance itself, Part
III.B discusses reforms to capital requirements, and Part III.C discusses
reforms to the organization of the entire financial services industry.
A. I Want It That Way: Reforms to the System of Deposit Insurance Itself
This Part examines those reforms that would solve the problems created
by deposit insurance by making legal changes to the operation of deposit
insurance itself. Part III.A.1 begins by discussing proposals to improve the
FDIC’s system of risk-based premiums. Then, Part III.A.2 analyzes
reforming deposit insurance through the institution of other market-based
reforms, including the possibility of eliminating federally sponsored deposit
insurance.
1. I Like Risk-Based Premiums and I Cannot Lie: How Creating Better
Risk-Based Premiums Can Solve the Problems of Deposit Insurance
Of all the ways to deal with the problems created by federally sponsored
deposit insurance, one of the most obvious is to make adjustments to the
system itself. As discussed in Part II, the FDIC currently charges a riskbased premium as part of its attempt to reduce the ability of banks to take
advantage of the cheap federally subsidized funds provided by deposit
insurance, thereby forcing them to internalize the cost of their risk.315 As a
result, improving this system of premium pricing so that it accurately
reflects the risk of an institution is one way to mitigate the problems created
by federally sponsored deposit insurance.
An improved system of risk-based pricing, which charges banks a
premium that accurately represents their level of risk, would have a number
of benefits. It would force banks to bear the cost of their own risk taking
and would prevent underpriced insurance from distorting bank managers’
incentives.316 It would also reduce the incentive for risk taking generally
by forcing banks to take risks commensurate with their returns.317
Several reforms have been proposed to improve the premium system.
One proposed reform is to charge premiums to banks and LCFIs at the
holding company level.318 The theory behind such a measure is that it
would create higher payments for banks that are TBTF and would more

315. See supra notes 233–34 and accompanying text.
316. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 328.
317. See Anna Kuzmik Walker, Harnessing the Free Market: Reinsurance Models for
FDIC Deposit Insurance Pricing, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 735, 739 (1995).
318. See Scott E. Hein, Timothy W. Koch & Chrislain Nounamo, Moving FDIC
Insurance to an Asset-Based Assessment System: Evidence from the Special Assessment of
2009, 64 J. ECON. & BUS. 24, 31–34 (2012); see also SHEILA BAIR, BULL BY THE HORNS 335
(2012) (arguing that the FDIC should be permitted to charge assessments to LCFIs
themselves and not just insured banks).
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accurately represent the cost of their failure.319 Another possible reform
would be to improve the FDIC premium formula itself. For example, Viral
Acharya, Joào Santos, and Tanju Yorulmazer suggest that new factors
should be added to the risk-based premium formula.320
Yet another potential reform would be to allow the market to determine
appropriate premium pricing, instead of the FDIC. One way to obtain this
market pricing is through reinsurance.321 A reinsurance scheme in the
United States could take a variety of forms,322 but it would essentially make
a third party responsible for a portion of the loss the FDIC would
experience in a bank failure.323 The value of this reinsurance is not the
actual insurance it would provide against loss, but instead the market
information it would provide on the appropriate cost for risk.324 The FDIC
could then use this data directly to formulate a more accurate risk-based
premium. Alternatively, the FDIC could pass the cost of reinsurance
directly on to a bank, resulting in an additional payment for the bank that is
based on the market’s assessment of its risk, essentially a more accurate
risk-based premium.325
Utilizing the markets to create risk-based premiums has clear benefits.
Regulatory agencies like the FDIC inherently struggle to create accurate
risk-based premiums because they are not subject to market discipline, lack
experience, and are vulnerable to political pressure and industry
lobbying.326 However, a reinsurance model may also struggle to provide
accurate risk-based premiums for two reasons. First, firms entering the
deposit reinsurance market will, in the short run, lack the data and
experience to create effective premiums.327 Second, the accuracy of pricing
may be negatively impacted by the expectation that regulators and the
government will step in to save a bank that is TBTF.328
Overall, this underscores the larger problem with creating better riskbased premiums: it is easier said than done. Accurately calculating and
assessing risk is difficult, and thus so is creating a better system of
calculating premiums.329 Additionally, even if the FDIC had access to
market-based information from reinsurance, it may still be difficult to create

319. See Hein, Koch & Nounamo, supra note 318, at 31–34.
320. Acharya, Santos & Yorulmazer, supra note 86, at 97. Specifically, they suggest
adding metrics that account for systemic risk and the factors that cause it, such as bank
interconnectedness and the costs of resolution. See id.
321. See Walker, supra note 317, at 739.
322. See id. at 744–55.
323. See id. at 741.
324. See id. at 740.
325. See id. at 740–41.
326. See id. at 739–40.
327. See id. at 775–77 (noting that, regardless of initial difficulties, “the private sector’s
greater incentive to correlate risk and price, even with facility merely equal to the public
sector, will lead to improvements over the current FDIC pricing system”).
328. See id. at 789.
329. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 329; Acharya, Santos & Yorulmazer, supra
note 86, at 90.
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a more accurate risk-based formula.330 Thus, creating a more accurate riskbased premium may be desirable to reduce the subsidy that deposit
insurance gives to banks, but it may not be accomplishable.331
2. Living La Vida Free Market: Reducing the Subsidy by Eliminating It:
Expanded Coinsurance or Ending Deposit Insurance
Another possible way to fix the system of deposit insurance is to reduce
the level of coverage. More specifically, the government could expand the
use of coinsurance or eliminate federally sponsored deposit insurance
entirely. A system of expanded coinsurance would limit the availability of
deposit insurance by either lowering the overall insured amount, or making
some percentage less than 100 percent of the insured amount available to
depositors in the event of a bank failure.332 In fact, the original deposit
insurance plan, outlined in the Banking Act of 1933, contemplated such a
scheme. It provided 100 percent protection of the first $10,000 of each
depositor, 75 percent coverage of the next $40,000 of deposits, and 50
percent coverage of all deposits in excess of $50,000.333 Currently,
depositors with deposits up to $250,000 are subject to no coinsurance, as
their deposits are 100 percent insured.334
The other possibility is to discontinue federally sponsored deposit
insurance. However, this does not necessarily mean that depositors would
be left unprotected. Depositors could safely invest their savings in money
market funds invested in Treasury bills or highly rated commercial
paper.335 In addition, as Charles Calomiris suggests, banks could operate
insurance programs among themselves, and the government could regulate
these insurance programs.336
The benefit of limiting or eliminating deposit insurance is that it would
prevent moral hazard by incentivizing depositors to monitor banks’
activities.337 Depositors would then demand higher interest rates to place

330. See Walker, supra note 317, at 785–89.
331. See Yuk-Shee Chan, Stuart I. Greenbaum & Anjan V. Thakor, Is Fairly Priced
Deposit Insurance Possible?, 47 J. FIN. 227, 243 (1992) (concluding perfectly priced deposit
insurance is impossible); see also Thomas L. Hogan & William J. Luther, Explicit and
Implicit Costs of Government Provided Deposit Insurance (June 13, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2083662
(concluding that accurately fair deposit insurance pricing is impossible because of outside
costs).
332. See Lawrence J. White, The Reform of Federal Deposit Insurance, 3 J. ECON. PERSP.
11, 22 (1989).
333. See supra notes 61–66 and accompanying text.
334. See supra Part I.A.
335. See RAJAN, supra note 302, at 179.
336. See Calomiris, supra note 32, at 295.
337. White, supra note 332, at 22; see also Edward J. Kane & Robert Hendershott, The
Federal Deposit Insurance Fund That Didn’t Put a Bite on U.S. Taxpayers, 20 J. BANKING &
FIN. 1305, 1325 (1996) (noting that coinsurance helps contain moral hazard and enhance
market discipline).
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their money in banks that engage in risky activities.338 The result would be
greater market discipline.339 Banks would lose the federal subsidy that
allows them to raise cheap funds,340 making certain high-risk activities less
profitable. Similarly, a renewed fear of bank runs would incentivize banks
to avoid excessive risk.341
However, there are several potential problems created by reducing or
eliminating deposit insurance. First, depositors may not be capable of
fulfilling the monitoring role that this system requires to function
effectively.342 They may lack the time, inclination, or skill to evaluate the
safety of their banks.343 Second, such a system may leave unsophisticated
depositors vulnerable to losing their entire life savings.344 Lastly, a system
of depositor monitoring may detract from overall economic stability.
Depositors’ reliance on imperfect information could initiate panicked mass
withdrawals, closing perfectly healthy banks and possibly initiating an
overall economic crisis.345
Reducing or eliminating deposit insurance therefore presents a difficult
choice.346 Limiting or removing deposit insurance may create harmful
bank runs and system fragility, but could incentivize banks to avoid highrisk activity.347 Conversely, keeping deposit insurance at its current level
eliminates bank runs and provides stability, but will decrease market
discipline.348 However, the scale between these competing choices may be
tipped towards the side of reducing coverage if one finds deposit insurance
fails to provide its stated benefits.
There is growing evidence that deposit insurance may not prevent bank
runs or contribute to economic stability. For example, one study recently
concluded that deposit insurance is only partially effective in preventing
bank runs, and that instead stronger and longer relationships between
depositors and their banks may be more effective.349 In fact, other
countries have still experienced bank runs despite having deposit insurance
systems.350 Similarly, other researchers have presented evidence that not
338. Alison M. Hashmall, After the Fall: A New Framework To Regulate “Too Big To
Fail” Non-bank Financial Institutions, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 829, 840 (2010).
339. See id. at 840.
340. RAJAN, supra note 302, at 178–79.
341. See Gubler, supra note 231, at 232–33.
342. See White, supra note 332, at 22 (noting that depositors are not likely to be the bestequipped group to carry out bank monitoring).
343. See Coppola, supra note 31, at 439.
344. See RAJAN, supra note 302, at 179 (describing how deposit insurance was intended
to protect household savings). But see CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 331 (noting that
coinsurance would protect depositors but would also allow for some of the benefits of
increased shareholder discipline).
345. See Chu, supra note 232, at 101; White, supra note 332, at 23; see also Kaufman,
supra note 30, at 27–28.
346. See Gubler, supra note 231, at 233.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. See Chu, supra note 232, at 101.
350. See id. at 105; see also RAJAN, supra note 302, at 179–80. Results like this may be
unsurprising considering a study in the Netherlands that revealed depositors knew little about
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only does deposit insurance fail to create economic stability, but instead
leads to instability over the long term.351
Yet, even if empirical research demonstrates that federally sponsored
deposit insurance does not provide its promised benefits, reducing or
eliminating it may still not be a viable reform. Whether people understand
it or not, deposit insurance enjoys substantial support from the public.352
Accordingly, politicians would be unlikely to support its shrinking or
elimination, and a reform of this type may be impossible.353
B. Hold on for One More Day: Improving Capital Requirements
As mentioned briefly in Part II, capital requirements are one way in
which the United States attempts to contain the problems created by having
a deposit insurance system.354 Banks can finance their purchase of assets
through capital/equity or debt (an example of which is deposits).355 Absent
deposit insurance, banks would be limited in their ability to finance asset
purchases through debt/deposits because as they used more debt, debt
holders and depositors would demand higher interest rates.356 However,
deposit insurance prevents depositors from demanding higher interest rates,
removes that limitation, and does so at cost to the government.357 Capital
requirements force banks to support their operations and asset purchases
with certain amounts of equity,358 and thereby try to correct this issue.359
Thus, they reduce the ability of banks to take advantage of deposits as
cheap federally subsidized funds.
Furthermore, capital requirements reduce the likelihood that banks will
fail. By ensuring that banks have a certain amount of resources on hand,
capital requirements seek to ensure that banks remain solvent in times of

their deposit insurance coverage. See Michiel Bijlsma & Karen van der Wiel, Consumer
Protection of Deposit Insurance: Little Awareness, Limited Effectiveness? 22 (Tilburg Law
and Economics Center, Discussion Paper No. 2012-013, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2034186 (finding that Dutch depositors
lacked detailed knowledge and trust in their deposit system).
351. See Chu, supra note 237, at 277 (concluding that deposit insurance does not make
the occurrence of bank crises less likely in the long run, and may actually increase that
likeliness); Chu, supra note 232, at 110 (finding that low coverage schemes are more likely
to have no banking crises); see also Kaufman, supra note 30, at 22 (noting that before the
advent of the explicit safety net and deposit insurance, banks in the United States actually
held higher capital ratios, assumed less risks, and failed slightly less than nonbank firms).
352. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 331 (describing how limiting deposit
insurance is “beyond the political pale”).
353. See id.; see also Kaufman, supra note 30, at 28 (assuming that government provided
deposit insurance, in some form, is a political fact of life).
354. See supra Part II.A.
355. See George J. Benston, The Purpose of Capital for Institutions with GovernmentInsured Desposits, 5 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 369, 373–74 (1992).
356. Id.
357. See supra Part II.
358. Joseph Jude Norton, Capital Adequacy Standards: A Legitimate Regulatory Control
for Prudential Supervision of Banking Activities?, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1299, 1313 (1989).
359. See Gubler, supra note 231, at 234.
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economic turmoil.360 This reduces both the risk to the DIF361 and the
possibility that a bailout will be necessary.362
Lastly, capital requirements also have an impact on bank managers’
incentives to engage in certain activities. Capital requirements force bank
owners and managers to have more of their own money at risk.363 This
reduces their incentive to engage in high-risk and potentially harmful
activities, including those that could exacerbate the problems at an already
troubled bank.364 In addition, it imposes an additional market test on bank
managers. While they may not have to convince depositors that their
institution is safe, they will need to convince investors in order to continue
the bank’s operations in that particular activity.365
Because of these benefits, both Dodd-Frank and Basel III sought to
improve and increase banks’ capital requirements.366 Additionally, several
other proposals have recommended increasing capital requirements even
further. The one most likely to become law is a regulation jointly proposed
by the FDIC, OCC, and FRB in July of 2013.367 The proposed regulation
calls for the eight largest LCFIs368 in the United States to hold greater
levels of capital at both the holding company level and in their FDICinsured subsidiary banks.369 Meanwhile, Senators David Vitter and
Sherrod Brown have proposed an even more aggressive approach.370 Their
bill would require LCFIs to increase their equity capital to 15 percent of
assets, but is unlikely to pass.371
Merely increasing capital requirements, however, may not be enough to
contain the risk taking of banks and LCFIs when supported by federally
subsidized funds. First, capital is a lagging indicator of problems, and may
360. See Carnell, supra note 88, at 357; see also Benston, supra note 355, at 374. But see
Norton, supra note 358, at 1351 (arguing that capital is never adequate in a worst case
scenario at a poorly run institution).
361. See Carnell, supra note 88, at 357.
362. See Lyngen, supra note 293, at 523.
363. See Carnell, supra note 88, at 357; see also Benston, supra note 355, at 374
(describing how capital requirements initiate the oversight of nongovernmental actors).
364. See Carnell, supra note 88, at 320–21; see also Benston, supra note 355, at 375;
Norton, supra note 358, at 1355 (describing how capital requirements force managers to
make better plans for their banks).
365. See Carnell, supra note 88, at 357.
366. See supra notes 294–95 and accompanying text.
367. The Triumph of Low Expectations, ECONOMIST, July 20, 2013, at 61, 61–62.
368. BOA, BNY Mellon, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, State
Street, and Wells Fargo. See id. This again demonstrates that many of the financial
regulations enacted since 2008 have been aimed at LCFIs with the goal of ending TBTF. See
Halah Touryalai, Big Banks Warn Regulators: Tougher Capital Rules Will Hurt Everyone,
FORBES (July 9, 2013, 4:25 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2013/07/09/
big-banks-warn-regulators-tougher-capital-rules-will-hurt-everyone/.
369. See Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Enhanced Supplementary
Leverage Ratio Standards for Certain Bank Holding Companies and Their Subsidiary
Insured Depository Institutions, 78 Fed. Reg. 51,101 (Aug. 20, 2013). This includes a 5
percent leverage ratio at the holding company level and a 6 percent level at the subsidiary
FDIC-insured bank. See Triumph of Low Expectations, supra note 367, at 61.
370. Too Big To Fail Act, S. 798, 113th Cong. (2013).
371. See The Triumph of Low Expectations, supra note 367, at 62.
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not accurately demonstrate that a bank is engaged in troubling activity.372
Indeed, a bank may appear capitalized on paper but still be heading for
insolvency.373 Second, the amount and quality of capital is difficult to
calculate.374 Judging an asset’s value is inherently difficult due to general
problems with accounting principles, the ability of banks to delay the
recognition of losses in financial reports, and the inability of regulators to
accurately calculate the value of assets themselves.375
Lastly, higher capital requirements may have negative economic
implications of their own. Higher capital requirements can restrain a bank’s
profitability and growth capabilities.376 Analysts have already predicted
that the regulation proposed by the FDIC, OCC, and FRB will further dilute
banks’ returns,377 could cause banks to leave certain industries, and may
limit the availability of credit in the United States.378 However, other
analysts have challenged these assertions, citing how profitable banks have
been since the imposition of new regulations after 2008.379 In the case of
the more aggressive bill proposed by Senators Vitter and Brown, the loss of
profit would have an even more substantial effect—it would likely cause
the largest LCFIs to break up.380
C. You Came in Like a Wrecking Ball: Reforms to the
Organization of the Entire Financial Services Industry
Part III.C analyzes proposed reforms that would ameliorate the problems
created by deposit insurance by reforming the structure of the entire
financial system. Part III.C.1 discusses proposals that seek to separate
commercial banks from investment banks, prevent the affiliations that allow
for the existence of LCFIs, and essentially reenact the GSA. Part III.C.2
reviews proposals that would severely limit the types of financial activities
that insured depository institutions could engage in, but that, in many cases,
would not limit their ability to affiliate with other financial firms and form
LCFIs.
1. Party in the GSA: A Return to Glass-Steagall-Type Prohibitions
While the ultimate effect of the legislation proposed by Senators Vitter
and Brown may be the breaking up of LCFIs, others have proposed a more
372. See Carnell, supra note 88, at 337.
373. See id. at 351.
374. See Norton, supra note 358, at 1361.
375. See Carnell, supra note 88, at 351. Basel III did attempt to solve some of these
problems, as demonstrated by the implementing regulations promulgated in the United
States. See Press Release, supra note 293. However, past Basel accords, regardless of their
reforms, have proved to be ineffective at preventing financial crisis. See Lyngen, supra note
293, at 526.
376. See Norton, supra note 358, at 1313.
377. See Triumph of Low Expectations, supra note 367, at 61–62.
378. Peter Eavis, Rising Bank Profits Tempt a Push for Tougher Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
18, 2013, at B8.
379. Id.
380. Id.

1274

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

direct approach. In an effort to fix the problems created by section 23A
(and prevent LCFIs from using the cheap federally subsidized funds in their
FDIC-insured subsidiaries to fund activities in other riskier subsidiaries),381
several legislators have proposed reinstating the GSA.382 These proposals
all differ somewhat in their details, yet they all would prevent FDIC-insured
banks from affiliating with securities firms and would inevitably shrink
LCFIs and FHCs.383
Proponents of reinstating the GSA384 argue it would have two benefits.
First, fully separating commercial banks from other more speculative
institutions is a simpler system to administer. It would be substantially
more straightforward than the Volcker rule,385 and given that affiliate
transactions are difficult to police, preventing affiliation would ensure that
the federal subsidy would not spread.386 Second, it would promote
macroeconomic stability. By separating banking institutions that are
essential to the economy from the risky endeavors of more speculative
affiliates, stability is increased by limiting banks’ exposure to risk.387 To
support this theory, proponents like Senator Elizabeth Warren have cited to
history, noting how the combination of deposit insurance, strict GSA
prohibitions, and SEC regulations provided fifty years of financial stability
before the GSA was impacted by deregulation.388
However, opponents of reinstating the GSA have questioned whether the
GSA actually contributed to macroeconomic stability when it was in effect.
Several studies have concluded that the activities the GSA was intended to
prevent (securities activities by commercial banks) had no impact on
causing the Great Depression.389 Opponents instead claim that GSA’s
381. See supra notes 272–84 and accompanying text.
382. See The 21st Century Glass-Steagall Act, S. 1282, 113th Cong. (2013); GlassSteagall Restoration Act, H.R. 2451, 112th Cong. (2011); Return to Prudent Banking Act,
H.R. 1489, 112th Cong. (2011); Banking Integrity Act, S. 2886, 111th Cong. (2009).
383. Alison Vekshin & James Sterngold, War on Wall Street As Congress Sees Returning
to Glass-Steagall, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 27, 2009, 7:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aeQNTmo2vHpo.
384. Even Sandy Weill, the former CEO of Citigroup, whose acquisition of Travelers
Insurance helped facilitate the GSA’s demise, declared on CNBC in the summer of 2012 that
GSA-type prohibitions should be brought back. Wall Street Legend Sandy Weill: Break Up
the Big Banks, CNBC (July 25, 2012, 8:02 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/48315170.
385. Ezra Klein, Elizabeth Warren: “That’s the Strongest Argument for a Modern GlassSteagall,” WASH. POST (May 14, 2012, 3:19 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
ezra-klein/post/elizabeth-warren-thats-the-strongest-argument-for-a-modern-glasssteagall/2012/05/14/gIQAfxTLPU_blog.html.
386. See Omarova, supra note 195, at 1774–75.
387. Id.; see also Joseph E. Stiglitz, Capitalist Fools, VANITY FAIR, Jan. 2009, at 48
(arguing that the repeal of the GSA transformed the financial culture to one where excessive
risks were acceptable and reinstating it could change that).
388. The Daily Show with Jon Stewart (Comedy Central television broadcast Apr. 15,
2009), available at http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/wed-april-15-2009/elizabethwarren-pt--2 (interviewing Elizabeth Warren, who argued that the effectiveness of GlassSteagall is demonstrated by the fifty years of economic stability it provided).
389. See FEIN, supra note 183, at 4-4 to -6. But see Wilmarth, supra note 175, at 611–15
(describing how allowing banks to engage in securities activities contributed to the banking
and economic crisis of the 1930s).
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separation of commercial banks from investment banks reflected the views
of key politicians and not what was empirically beneficial to the
economy.390 To the extent that the GSA had any positive impact at all,
opponents argue that it only did so because the United States was
entrenched in such a serious financial crisis that bold moves were the only
way to bring back public confidence.391
Opponents also argue that reinstating the GSA would hurt bank profits
and have a negative effect on the overall economy. Banks have consistently
insisted that their size, ability to affiliate, and ability to engage in an
expanded range of activities allows them to be more profitable.392 This was
part of the justification for ending the GSA in the first place.393 Thus,
opponents argue that reenacting the GSA, and forcing LCFIs to separate,
may make banks less profitable and create some measure of economic
harm.394
Overall, even if the GSA was reenacted, there is nothing to guarantee
that, like the original GSA, it would not be subject to the same slow erosion
as the turmoil of the 2008 financial crisis fades into memory.395
Additionally, while the goal of reinstating the GSA is to create
macroeconomic stability, it seeks to do so by breaking up LCFIs and ending
the implicit safety net of TBTF.396 It would do little to prevent insured
banks themselves from continuing to take advantage of deposit insurance to
engage in many of the highly speculative activities, including derivatives
trading, that are permitted as part of the business of banking.397
2. I Would Do Anything for Profit, but I Can’t Do That: Narrow Banking
and Only Allowing Banking at a Bank
Another approach that would involve substantial legal changes to the
entire financial services industry would be instituting a system of narrow
banking. Broadly speaking, in a system of narrow banking, FDIC-insured
banks would only be permitted to hold deposits and invest in safe assets.398
Under Professor Arthur Wilmarth’s narrow-banking proposal, there would
be two tiers of narrow banks.399 First-tier narrow banks would be those that
390. See FEIN, supra note 183, at 4-4 to -6.
391. Id.
392. See Wilmarth, supra note 18, at 223.
393. See Presidential Statement on Signing the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 35 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 2363–66 (Nov. 12, 1999).
394. Vekshin & Sterngold, supra note 383.
395. See supra Part I.C (describing how the GSA’s prohibitions were eroded by
regulators and courts over several decades).
396. Press Release, Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Senator, Senators Warren, McCain, Cantwell,
and King Introduce 21st Century Glass-Steagall Act (July 11, 2013), available at
http://www.warren.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=178.
397. See supra Part II.B. A number of proposed bills attempting to reenact the GSA also
include bans on proprietary trading. This would restrain many of the speculative activities
that banks engage in.
398. See Gubler, supra note 231, at 267. Safe assets can be defined in a number of ways.
See id.; see also CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 333.
399. Wilmarth, supra note 228, at 7.
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were not part of a financial holding company, mostly small community
banks.400 These banks would be permitted to take deposits and engage in a
broad range of other banking-related services.401 They would have the
ability to purchase derivatives as end users, but only to hedge against
risk.402 Second-tier narrow banks would be those FDIC-insured banks that
are affiliated with FHCs, and would consist of the United States’ largest
banking organizations.403 These banks would be permitted to take deposits,
but would hold all of their assets as short-term securities that could be
marked to market, and would essentially operate as money market mutual
funds.404 These banks would be prohibited from extending any credit or
transferring any funds to their FHC affiliates.405 Also, like the first-tier
narrow banks, these banks would be prohibited from dealing in derivatives,
except to purchase them as end users to hedge against risk.406
Sheila Bair, the former chairman of the FDIC, has advocated for a similar
system. In her book Bull by the Horns, she proposes that insured depository
institutions that are subsidiaries of LCFIs should only be used to support
traditional banking operations.407 She would then require that all
nontraditional banking activities be conducted in other LCFI affiliates that
are not in any way supported by insured deposits.408
The overall result is that narrow banking would force LCFIs to rely on
uninsured debt and equity rather than on less expensive federally insured
deposits.409 Proponents argue that this would ensure that LCFIs cannot
exploit the federal subsidy to engage in speculative activities either within
their banks or affiliated financial entities,410 and would force LCFIs and
banks to prove that their speculative activities actually provided worthwhile
returns.411 Ultimately, if the LCFIs that relied on these activities could not
prove their profitability, they would be forced to break up, and in turn, also
reduce the implicit subsidy created by TBTF.412
The primary problem with narrow banking is that it may have adverse
economic effects. Narrow banks may make credit less available for
individuals and businesses, as banks may become less willing to originate
and hold illiquid assets.413 Also, narrow banking, by restricting a bank to
400. Id. at 2.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 2–3.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. See BAIR, supra note 318, at 329–30.
408. See id.
409. See id.; see also ROBERT E. LITAN, WHAT SHOULD BANKS DO? 178 (1987).
410. See LITAN, supra note 409, at 178.
411. See BAIR, supra note 318, at 329–30; Wilmarth, supra note 228, at 5–6; see also
LITAN, supra note 409, at 178.
412. See LITAN, supra note 409, at 178.
413. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 333. But see Wilmarth, supra note 228, at 6
(arguing that his plan, by allowing first-tier narrow banks to still lend commercial loans,
would mitigate this problem).
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holding safe assets, would reduce its rate of return and shrink its net
income.414 Lastly, the other problem with narrow banking is that it would
be a radical change.415 It would drastically alter the way that banks operate
in the economy and in society,416 and this may make it politically
impossible.
IV. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?: CREATING A MODERN DEPOSIT
INSURANCE FRAMEWORK TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC STABILITY AND
PROTECT DEPOSITORS
Ultimately, the reforms that this Note advocates for are those that
acknowledge the realities of the modern financial system in the United
States and deal with the problems created by deposit insurance by relying
on the power of the free market. Part IV.A discusses why such reforms are
preferable. Part IV.B then articulates the specific reforms to the law that
this Note advocates.
A. Don’t Stop Believing: Why Market-Oriented Reforms Should Be
Enacted To Solve the Problems Created by Deposit Insurance
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, and the bailouts of LCFIs
that came with it, the public and politicians understandably expressed a
desire to end the implicit subsidy provided by TBTF that motivated LCFIs
to take the excessive risks that ultimately wrecked the economy.417 Since
then, Dodd-Frank, the regulations promulgated in its wake, and several
other proposals to fix the U.S. financial system have all focused on that
goal.418 However, if the problem with the implicit safety net of TBTF is
that it gives LCFIs the incentive to engage in highly speculative activities,
then the problem with deposit insurance and the explicit safety net is that it
gives LCFIs the cheap funds to help make those speculative activities
profitable.419 Thus, this Note advocates first and foremost for reforms that
equally address that issue as much as TBTF.
In many ways, the operation of federally sponsored deposit insurance in
the United States represents an antiquated system. Founded in 1933, the
FDIC was established during a much different time where the GSA
prevented banks from being affiliated with securities firms,420 the business
of banking did not include complex derivatives,421 the LCFIs that dominate
today’s financial landscape did not exist,422 and indeed, the financial
industry itself was much simpler. The United States has taken some strides
414. R. Alton Gilbert, A Comparison of Proposals To Restructure the U.S. Financial
System, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV., July/August 1988, 58, 74–75.
415. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 333.
416. See id.
417. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
418. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
419. See supra Part II.A–B and accompanying text.
420. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
421. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
422. See supra notes 172–76 and accompanying text.
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to adjust deposit insurance and financial regulation to the realities of
modern times, including implementing risk-based premiums, requiring least
cost resolution methods,423 and giving the FDIC the power of the OLA to
take over and resolve failing LCFIs.424
However, even recent reforms to the system of financial regulation seem
to have done little to limit LCFIs from engaging in speculative activity and
taking advantage of the cheap federally subsidized funds provided by
deposit insurance.425 Section 23A remains difficult to enforce. Its waiver
system is seemingly still vulnerable, and thus it is largely ineffective in
preventing LCFIs from taking advantage of insured deposits to support the
activities of nonbank affiliates.426 The Lincoln Amendment will change
little of what insured depository institutions are permitted to do with
The Volcker rule, with many of its implementing
derivatives.427
regulations still unfinished as of this writing, is still unlikely to stop banks
from gambling with insured deposits and turning a profit, while nominally
calling it hedging risk, as exemplified by the London Whale incident.428
What, then, is the answer? Many believe that reenacting the GSA or
significantly raising capital requirements would help prevent LCFIs from
engaging in high-risk activities and utilizing federally subsidized
deposits.429 But such reforms are not without cost.430 While banks have
demonstrated an ability to remain profitable in the wake of all the
regulations passed since 2008, their warnings of a potential loss in profits
may not just be exaggeration.431 Whether they are politically popular or
not, banks and LCFIs are integral parts of the nation’s economy.432 Cutting
back their profits too much, even in the name of protecting the financial
system and creating a more stable economy, would, in the long run, benefit
no one.
As an alternative, this Note advocates for letting the market decide what
activities are most profitable for LCFIs. No longer should federally
subsidized funds support highly speculative activities by allowing them to
be profitable. No longer should regulators debate what activities LCFIs
should or should not be engaged in. Thinking logically, the easiest way to
eliminate the federal subsidy provided by deposit insurance and increase
market discipline would be to eliminate deposit insurance, but there are
many reasons this is an unacceptable choice politically, socially, and
economically.433 Instead, this Note advocates for several reforms that
should be made to decrease the federal subsidy provided by deposit
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.

See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 114–29 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.B.3.
See supra notes 312–14 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 304–07 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 358–65, 387–88.
See supra notes 376–77, 392–94 and accompanying text.
See Eavis, supra note 378.
See id. (describing the negative broader economic effects of overregulating banks).
See supra Part III.A.2 and accompanying text.
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insurance and increase market discipline on banks and LCFIs. Principally,
this Note recommends a system requiring narrow depository institutions,
and if that is politically unattainable, the institution of coinsurance and a
prefunded OLF.
B. Give It to Me Baby: What a Modern System Should Look Like
Echoing the proposal by Sheila Bair in her book Bull by the Horns,
LCFIs should be permitted to own insured depository institutions, but they
should only be permitted to operate narrowly as commercial banks
conducting traditional banking activities like lending.434 All of an LCFI’s
securities, derivative, and other speculative activities should be conducted
in separate affiliates.435 There should be an ironclad ban on transactions
between insured depository institution affiliates and other affiliates in an
LCFI,436 with no possibility of waiver. This would prevent the problems
that have plagued section 23A, and ensure that insured deposits are never
allowed to support highly speculative activities. Lastly, in order to continue
to aid the competitiveness of community banks, insured depository
institutions that are not part of LCFIs should be permitted to engage in a
limited number of nontraditional bank activities.437
This system would end the ability of banks to utilize cheap federally
subsidized deposits to fund and profit from speculative activities.438 LCFIs
will be forced instead to attract funding from private investors who will
charge an interest rate commensurate to the level of risk of the activity.439
Thus, banks and LCFIs will only be able to engage in highly speculative
activities if they and their investors decide those activities truly are
profitable.
While a system of narrow depository institutions would be the best
solution to solve the problems created by deposit insurance, it also
represents a radical legal change.440 Therefore, instituting narrow banking
may be politically impossible.
Given that reality, this Note also
recommends two smaller reforms that would require little change to the
law, but could also substantively improve the system.
First, the FDIC should adopt a system of coinsurance, as was originally
contemplated in the Banking Act of 1933.441 For example, deposits of
$0.01–$50,000.00 would be 100 percent insured, deposits from
$50,000.01–$150,000.00 would be 50 percent insured, and deposits from
$150,000.01–$250,000.00 would be 25 percent insured. This would force

434. See supra note 398 and accompanying text; see also BAIR, supra note 318, at 329–
30.
435. See supra notes 403–06 and accompanying text; see also BAIR, supra note 318, at
329–30.
436. See supra note 405 and accompanying text.
437. See supra notes 400–02.
438. See supra notes 409–11 and accompanying text.
439. See supra notes 409–11 and accompanying text.
440. See supra note 415 and accompanying text.
441. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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depositors to have a greater interest in monitoring442 their banks, and in
turn, subject banks and LCFIs to slightly greater discipline.443 If depositors
are concerned they will lose part of their money, they will be more likely to
remove it if they become concerned with a bank’s health, and this will force
banks to either take on less risk or pay higher interest rates to compensate
depositors for that risk.444 At the same time, because much of their money
is still protected, coinsurance should insure against mass panics that would
cause bank runs445 and protect highly unsophisticated depositors.446
Second, the DIF should be eliminated, and the resolutions of both banks
and SIFIs should be financed through a new prefunded OLF. Under this
system, covered financial institutions (SIFIs and commercial banks) would
make a yearly payment to the FDIC that represents a percentage of what it
would cost to resolve the institution if it failed. All payments to the OLF
would be made at the holding company level.447 This means banks that are
part of a SIFI will not have to make a separate payment, but that LCFIs,
who have not been designated as SIFIs, but operate a commercial bank, will
have to pay at the holding company level for the potential resolution of the
entire LCFI.448 Thus, the focus will no longer be solely on commercial
banks, but on the truly important institutions whose failure actually presents
the greatest risk to the financial sector and the economy, and will force
them to internalize the costs of their risk, not the taxpayers.449 This will
also capture the reality that many SIFIs and LCFIs flout the rules of section
23A and take advantage of the federal subsidy provided by deposit
insurance to their affiliate commercial banks.450

442. While some argue that depositors lack the time and sophistication to engage in such
monitoring, this may overestimate what monitoring involves. Depositors need not be
financial experts, but rather only need to learn that a bank is engaged in something analysts
believe is highly speculative. The excessively risky activities or mistakes of banks and
financial institutions are often publicized in the mainstream press. Even without a complex
understanding of the underlying actions involved, depositors would be sophisticated enough
to tell the difference between good and bad. See Ruth Simon, Mortgage Lenders Loosen
Standards: Despite Growing Concerns, Banks Keep Relaxing Credit-Score, Income and
Debt-Load Rules, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2005, at D1 (demonstrating that, even in 2005, there
was publicly available knowledge that banks were engaged in high-risk lending practices);
see also David Benoit, From J.P. Morgan’s ‘Whale’ to Facebook’s IPO: Deal Journal’s
Most Read Posts of the Year, WALL ST. J. DEAL J. (Dec. 31, 2012, 11:48 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2012/12/31/from-j-p-morgans-whale-to-facebooks-ipo-dealjournals-most-read-posts-of-the-year/ (demonstrating that many people were interested in
and read about J.P. Morgan’s London Whale incident).
443. See supra notes 337–41 and accompanying text.
444. See supra notes 337–41 and accompanying text.
445. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
446. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 331 (noting that coinsurance would protect
depositors but would also allow for some of the benefits of increased shareholder discipline).
447. See supra notes 318–19 and accompanying text.
448. See supra notes 318–19 and accompanying text.
449. See BAIR, supra note 318, at 335–36.
450. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Too often, the debate on reform has been dominated by concern over
TBTF, bailouts, and implicit government guarantees.451 This is not to say
that those issues are unimportant. However, while the public and
politicians continue to debate TBTF, deposit insurance continues to provide
a subsidy to banks and LCFIs that allows them to artificially create profits
by engaging in speculative activities. Indeed, analysts may someday look
back at these very activities as the cause of the next financial crisis.
To solve this problem, this Note proposes a system of narrow depository
institutions. This proposal would involve substantial changes to the law
and the practices of LCFIs, but narrow banking is the most direct way to
pry the mouths of LCFIs off the faucet of cheap federally subsidized funds,
while at the same time protecting depositors. Yet, as political gridlock in
Washington makes wholesale change increasingly unlikely, this Note also
proposes smaller measures to improve the current system: coinsurance and
prefunding the OLF with assessments charged to bank and SIFI holding
companies. While these reforms would not solve the problems created by
deposit insurance entirely, they would be an important first step towards
creating a safer financial system in the United States. In other words, if the
mouths of LCFIs cannot be ripped off the faucet of cheap federally
subsidized funds, the United States should at least make the water taste a
little more bitter.

451. See supra Part II.C and accompanying text.

